Advertisement
Advertisement
Andrew Leung
Andrew Leung has had decades of experience as a senior Hong Kong government official in a variety of fields including finance, industry, social welfare and overseas representation. Since his retirement in 2005, he has built up a reputation as an international and independent China strategist. He features regularly in international TV channels and conferences.
As US-China tensions escalate, the next presidential administration must reckon with misplaced narratives that undergird American policy.
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the US-China cold war and tensions over Taiwan are threatening to change the world order and making policymakers sit up
From US support for Israel in Gaza to Biden’s turnaround on using TikTok for his re-election campaign, America’s breathtakingly transparent double standards are killing its credibility.
With a ‘one country, two systems’ formula out of favour, Beijing may need to think outside the box and spell out a more liberal and accommodative constitutional package.
Advertisement
China is working on the genuine concerns poisoning its relationship with the West, such as better market access and intellectual property protection. It wants to show it is part of the solution for a better world.
Chinese firms dominate green industries from renewable energy to electric vehicles, China’s Belt and Road Initiative promotes green projects and even its e-commerce push brings energy savings.
In a world where cooperation trumps zero-sum combat, America’s exceptionalism may truly shine. Grand possibilities and the world’s problems await US re-engagement with China.
For all the diplomatic overtures, and talk of de-risking and not decoupling, the US continues to corral allies and treat China as a threat – Antony Blinken’s visit will not change this.
The liberal world order the US led after World War II is falling apart and taking the credibility of US leadership down with it. Xi Jinping’s warm reception in the Middle East underlines the appeal of its vison of a multilateral, fairer and more inclusive world.
As Washington tries to contain both Russia and China, it faces an increasingly war-weary Europe and a developing world reluctant to take sides. America’s own social and political rifts are causing some to question its entitlement for calling the shots in an increasingly multipolar world.
The proof of Lee’s ‘results-oriented’ leadership will lie in what he can deliver during his first crucial months in office. Putting aside long-term goals, there are plenty of smaller milestones Lee can reach, including reopening the mainland border and providing temporary relief to cage-home dwellers.
Chief executive candidate John Lee has promised ‘results-oriented’ leadership and vowed to build a more competitive and politically stable city if he is elected. To deliver, he would need to make government ministers more accountable, encourage integration with the Greater Bay Area, and take steps towards universal suffrage.
Beijing has earned the right to be treated on an equal footing even as hardening competition proves damaging to both countries when there are so many areas of potential cooperation.
Concern over income inequality has driven China’s leaders to adopt a three-pronged strategy focusing on poverty eradication, reorientation of the economy towards a ‘high quality’ model, and encouraging philanthropy.
The US must grasp the inconvenient reality that China will become the world’s largest economy sooner rather than later. With most US allies hedging their bets, the ‘existential threat’ approach looks like theatrics trying to shore up Pax Americana.
China’s rise must be acknowledged, but exaggerating its capabilities and ambition is unhelpful. Great power competition is not a strategy, and there are more subtle ways to respond, including by ‘nudging’ China through cooperation.
Support for the disgraced leader’s brand of politics cuts across a wide swathe of US society, tapping into people’s deep-seated frustrations. Joe Biden should expect an uphill battle getting his administration’s agenda passed in Congress.
The digital renminbi is a sovereign currency fully backed by the state, does not require a bank account and has full oversight by Chinese banking authorities. Developing countries will embrace the convenience of China’s digital payment systems.
China means to become moderately prosperous by 2035, despite a more hostile external environment. But to achieve its goal, it would do well to address the world’s misgivings by working with the incoming Biden administration.
Given how intricately integrated China is into the international economic order, a global anti-Beijing axis of ‘democracies’ is unrealistic. Meanwhile, Chinese people’s satisfaction with their government has only increased.
What can the world expect from China in this new decade? Besides US-China tension, slower Chinese economic growth, vertical integration and the tilt towards domestic consumption are all likely to have an effect on the rest of the world.
Hongkongers have signalled their intent for greater democracy, and pan-democrats’ electoral momentum will continue if the issue is not unaddressed. A solution will involve meeting some protest demands, but also Beijing’s national security concerns.
Beijing will never bend to mob coercion but is reluctant to send in the PLA and wants to preserve ‘one country, two systems’. A sensible proposal is to combine enactment of Article 23 with seeking a more progressive package for universal suffrage.
Without unpacking the protests’ complex dynamics, dialogue and remedial action risk missing their mark. Apart from policies targeting youth empowerment, assurances on ‘one country, two systems’, as seen before 1997, would go a long way towards easing the unrest.
The central government understands the extradition bill triggered widespread anxiety about Hong Kong’s future. While maintaining law and order is the immediate priority, in the long term, a package addressing both universal suffrage and Article 23 could be negotiated.
Beijing should treat broad anti-China sentiment as a chance to not only speed up structural reforms, but also embrace soft power changes that will make the Chinese dream easier to achieve.
The US is confronting China in multiple arenas, ranging from technology to Taiwan and the South China Sea. China can emerge stronger if it makes changes that benefit both itself and the US while retaining its development model.
Whatever US’ reasons, and whatever methods it may use, China is far too integrated into global supply chains for the US containment strategy to end its upwards trajectory.
The US’ concerns about China aren’t just shared by other countries, they also align with the mainland’s own goals for its future.
Despite the extensions to Xi Jinping’s power, there are still protocols and procedures limiting what he can do, and there are still ways of engaging China other than in destructive confrontation.
