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Asian Angle | Why the Philippines should rethink its South China Sea name-and-shame game

  • Manila’s transparency strategy to expose Beijing’s transgressions has paid off, to an extent. But it won’t change China’s behaviour

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Why you can trust SCMP
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Philippine and Chinese coastguard vessels during an incident in the South China Sea earlier this month. Photo: China Coast Guard via Weibo/Handout via Reuters
The Philippines’ transparency overdrive and alliance build-up to deter China in the West Philippine Sea have earned praise and rebuke. How does the strategy measure up against desired results? What did it achieve and is it due for calibration?
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Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, the Philippines pursued a new approach in the maritime hotspot. Manila adopted a transparency initiative to expose China’s grey zone actions that have disrupted regular economic and security activities around the Southeast Asian country’s administered features and waters in its western exclusive economic zone. By naming and shaming Beijing, the intention was that reputational costs would compel China to change course. This did not materialise. While Beijing may have been initially caught off guard by the new approach, it soon adjusted and brought its cameras, videos, and narratives to refute and counter Manila’s campaign.
Another factor in the equation was the deepening alliance between the Philippines and its partners, such as the US. American military access was expanded, and US missiles were deployed on Philippine soil. A pact that facilitated joint training with Japan was signed, and a similar deal with France is under consideration. Combined military exercises with allies and partners got bigger, bolder and more frequent. The theory was that such activities and posturing would discourage further Chinese intrusions. This assumption did not hold, either. Beijing became the uninvited observer of such multilateral naval exercises, daringly trailing allied sails in the South China Sea and even conducting concurrent manoeuvres on its own or with Russia in response.
Armed Chinese coastguard personnel approach Philippine troops on a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea on June 17. Photo: AP
Armed Chinese coastguard personnel approach Philippine troops on a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea on June 17. Photo: AP

Far from easing tensions, mutual recriminations heightened the temperature in choppy waters. Both sides pandered to their domestic base. Maritime incidents worsened alarmingly, ranging from the use of lasers, dangerous manoeuvres, ship collisions, and water-cannon blasting to a physical scuffle that resulted in injuries to sailors. Flashpoints flared up at the Second Thomas, Scarborough, and Sabina Shoals. Chinese vessels sighted in Philippine waters increased. Beyond the West Philippine Sea, they were also spotted in the Philippine Sea in the east and Basilan and Sibutu Straits in the south. Close calls also occurred in the sky, with People’s Liberation Army aircraft dropping flares in the path of a Philippine Air Force plane patrolling in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.

Transparency can be a useful tactic, and Manila is not the first to employ it in the South China Sea. But there is a difference between exposing a rival for exposure’s sake and calculated exposure as diplomatic leverage. The former aims to inflict open-ended maximum reputational cost without creating pathways for de-escalation. The second is more restrained, incident-specific, and opens doors for off-ramps to cool tensions.

At present, activities in the South China Sea would not go unnoticed. Air and sea patrols and commercial satellite solutions can easily reveal reclamation work, militarisation of occupied features, or congregations of vessels. Even the movement of ships that turn off their automatic identification systems at night can be tracked.

02:40

Beijing, Manila trade ‘ramming’ claims in latest South China Sea coastguard incident

Beijing, Manila trade ‘ramming’ claims in latest South China Sea coastguard incident

Coastal states now have access to more information, which can be leveraged for diplomatic protests or negotiations. Sharing or leaking this information to the public and media has become a useful card to be played sparingly to illustrate a point or elicit a desired reply. Dangling the prospect of using such a card may also have more value than putting it on the table.

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