Thailand’s Myanmar approach exposes cracks in Asean that external parties may exploit
- Myanmar represents Asean’s biggest internal challenge to date, and Thailand’s bid for a ‘complementary’ diplomatic initiative undermines the bloc’s centrality
- Thailand’s pursuit of short-term gains only serves to expose Asean’s internal flaws to external parties keen to exploit these divisions for their own ends
National vs regional interests
As compelling as this logic may be, the region must remember that Myanmar’s problems are long-standing and systemic, and the 2021 coup simply exacerbated these problems.
The Track 1.5 meetings – talks between government figures and non-official parties – that Thailand and India convened this year in March and April did not consider inviting or openly engaging Myanmar stakeholders other than the SAC.
Thailand’s informal talks with Myanmar junta expose Asean divisions
Thailand’s decision to elevate discussions to a regional meeting just a few weeks before Asean foreign ministers were due to meet in Jakarta for the AMM added to the confusion. Long-time analysts of Myanmar’s political landscape cautioned that such competing moves would benefit the SAC and not improve the situation.
The extent of divergence in views among mainland and maritime Asean members over the regional response to the Myanmar crisis has become more evident since Asean’s unprecedented decision to downgrade the SAC’s presence at Asean summits, and subsequently foreign ministers’ meetings, to a non-political representative.
The SAC has cleverly leveraged Asean’s divided stance to pursue its narrow interests. As a result, there have been cynical pretexts and justifications to “re-engage” the SAC from some member states.
What has Indonesia’s quiet diplomacy achieved?
This has also frustrated Asean.
Retno acknowledged as much when she observed that it was a “very complex exercise” and “not easy at all”. Speaking ahead of the 42nd Asean Summit in May, she said that “differences in positions of stakeholders are wide and deep”.
However, Indonesia has defended its quiet diplomacy approach as necessary to build some level of shared agreement for a political solution through inclusive dialogue. Indonesia’s emphasis on engaging with various stakeholders reflects an understanding that reducing Myanmar’s complex and multidimensional crisis to binary terms will only deepen political divides.
Various Myanmar stakeholders are quietly appreciative of Indonesia’s approach and expressed a desire to see it continue beyond Indonesia’s chairmanship term. Indonesian ambassador Ngurah Swajaya, the Head of the Office of the Special Envoy under Indonesia’s watch, had met some of them.
Speaking anonymously for security reasons, these stakeholders have shared that Indonesia’s approach in 2023 differed from the previous Asean chairs in that ethnic concerns and opinions were seen as core elements of an inclusive dialogue. In fact, many groups and stakeholders indifferent to the NLD and Suu Kyi have been participating in and sustaining the current resistance to the military since the 2021 coup.
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Short-term gains, long-term pains
By prioritising its own interests above regional interests, Thailand may have had short-term success in emphasising its diplomatic prowess and demonstrating Asean’s incompetence, but what is the purpose of this short-term victory at the expense of Asean unity?
Myanmar represents Asean’s biggest internal challenge to date, threatening the bloc’s centrality. Among Asean members, the view is that the Myanmar crisis should not hamper regional integration. Competing narrow domestic interests have added to the internal divisions.
The actions of one member state going against advice from the other members, notably by the Indonesian chair calling on her peers to “safeguard existing momentum” to implement the Five-Point Consensus, is tantamount to undermining Asean unity.
In fact, the November 2022 Asean Leaders’ Review and Decision on the consensus stated that engagement with Myanmar should be “primarily undertaken by the Special Envoy of the Asean Chair on Myanmar due to the neutrality that is inherent in his/her mandate”. Thailand’s subsequent actions, starting with the neighbours’ meeting in December 2022 show otherwise.
By calling its initiative “complementary” to Asean when no prior discussion had taken place, Thailand’s moves run counter to Indonesia’s inclusive consultative approach, and can even be interpreted as consistent undermining of the Asean chair in a manner not seen during the last two chairmanships under Brunei and Cambodia.
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What’s next?
The five-point consensus – warts and all – remains the only stick in Asean’s possession to impose stricter measures on the SAC. Discarding it would take away Asean’s only legitimate means of intervening constructively and collectively in the Myanmar crisis. As former Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa has suggested, the SAC should be held accountable for not attending Asean meetings.
Indonesia will now focus on handing over its responsibilities to incoming chair Laos. An institutionalisation of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Asean chair affords the quiet diplomacy and engagement approach a chance, assuming the next chair is supportive. Having a dedicated office to shepherd the process of managing talks about the talks and creating a conducive environment for all parties to come to the table is essential.
Conducting 110 engagements through the year while managing an active foreign ministry portfolio is commendable, but not every Asean chair can pull off such a feat. Members of the international community who have expressed support for Asean’s response to the Myanmar crisis can surely find the wherewithal to support an institutional process that ensures consistent momentum.
