My World Atlas from the US ambassador is physical evidence of how until recently, the US had not disputed or objected to China’s claims. It includes a map of the South China Sea, showing clearly the “nine-dash line” which delineates China’s sovereign claim (Exhibit 2).

If Washington had objected to this line, the US embassy in Beijing would not have procured and custom-encased this atlas for the ambassador to give out as a gift.

Indeed, Taiwan, which mainland China considers a breakaway province, has more extensive claims in the South China Sea than Beijing: whereas Beijing’s sovereign claim is defined by the nine-dash line, Taipei’s is defined by an eleven-dash line.

Aside from these differences, mainland China’s claims to the South China Sea completely overlap with those of Taiwan, as they share their origin. And because Beijing considers Taiwan part of China, it does not challenge Taipei’s territorial claims. Neither does Taipei challenge Beijing’s.

In 1934 and 1935, the Nationalist government published two documents, “Map of South Sea Islands” (Exhibit 3) and “A Table Comparing Chinese and English Names of China South Sea Islands” which further codified this claim.

On October 4, 1946, having reclaimed sovereignty over territories Japan had captured during World War II, the Nationalist government in Nanking published “The General Location of South Sea Islands in the Territory of the Republic of China” that for the first time used an eight-dash U-shaped line (Exhibit 4). A year later, on December 1, 1947, it again released a “Map of South Sea Islands” (Exhibit 5) that marked the boundaries of China’s sovereign claims with the eleven-dash line. (While the number of dashes shifted over time, the area encircled on each map is largely the same.)

A more recent government position paper states that the South China Sea islands “were first discovered, named, and used by the ancient Chinese, and incorporated into national territory and administered by imperial Chinese governments. Whether from the perspective of history, geography, or international law, the South China Sea islands and their surrounding waters are an inherent part of [our] territory and waters.”

It further notes: “After the end of World War II, [our] government, with support from other Allied nations, stationed forces on the South China Sea islands in 1946. Its exercise of jurisdiction through continued administration, management, and development of the islands strengthened its sovereign claim under international law.”

You might think this position paper was issued by Beijing. It was not. It was actually issued by Taiwan as recently as March 21, 2016. But, of course, it could have been issued by Beijing whose position is identical with Taipei’s. The US, incidentally, has never challenged Taiwan’s sovereign claims in the South China Sea.

There is no evidence that Beijing seeks to expand its territorial claims beyond historical ones. Mainland China has given up some territorial claims to resolve border disputes, having settled boundaries with 13 of its 14 land neighbours. But Taiwan has not. Until 2002, Taiwan refused to recognise the independence of Mongolia, which broke off from China in 1946.

Taiwan’s position paper further notes: “An absence of protest [in 1946] from countries in the region … and their tacit recognition of ROC [Republic of China] sovereignty over the islands further bolstered the ROC’s claim.”

Why did other claimants not object to the claim of sovereignty at that time? Because all of them were still the colonies of foreign powers, none of which – including the US, Britain and France – raised any objection. (Although France would occasionally tussle over some islands when China was at war).

These other countries’ claims to the islands of the South China Sea rest on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which came into effect on November 16, 1994. Unclos generally considers a country’s coastal waters to include the “continental shelf”, where the ocean is no deeper than 200 metres, and “exclusive economic zones” of up to 200 nautical miles from the shore.

China joined Unclos with the explicit condition that its sovereignty not be infringed or violated, as did many other countries. The US often refers to Unclos when criticising China’s claims, but the US itself has never ratified the convention, arguing that it is unfavourable to American economic and security interests – which puts its position on rather shaky grounds.

The reality on the ground is that each of the claimants controls at least a few of the disputed islands and reefs. By various accounts, of the islands and reefs that make up the Nansha (Spratly) Islands alone, Vietnam controls approximately 30; mainland China 16; Taiwan three; the Philippines 13; Malaysia 17; and Brunei one.

It is important to note that mainland China does not consider all the waters within the nine-dash line to be its sovereign waters. All the maps it has ever published are labelled as maps of South Sea islands. Hence, it does not object to freedom of navigation and overflights in well-established international passageways through the South China Sea.

Indeed, all of the countries that border this disputed area rely on it for a great share of their prosperity. All of them, China included, need freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Peace and stability is in the best interest of all. While territorial disputes are likely to be permanent, maintaining the status quo, formulating a code of conduct, shelving disputes and jointly developing the resources are the best and only option to all.

Weijian Shan is the author of Out of the Gobi (2019) and Money Games (2020)