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Protesters burn pictures of US President-elect Joe Biden and President Donald Trump during a demonstration against the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on Saturday. Photo: Reuters
Opinion
Opinion
by Alessandro Arduino
Opinion
by Alessandro Arduino

Iran’s enemies are spoiling for a fight, so how will it respond to top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh’s assassination?

  • From cyberattacks to missile strikes to full-blown proxy warfare, Tehran‘s retaliation for the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh could take many forms
  • But after four years of Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, Iran is desperate for relief and a fresh start with a new US government
A day after Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading Iranian nuclear physicist, was assassinated while travelling in his car on the outskirts of Tehran, the country’s president, Hassan Rowhani, openly accused Israel of murder.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had previously named Fakhrizadeh, who was head of Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, as a key player in the Iranian nuclear programme and pointedly told a news conference to “remember the name”.

Iran blames Israel for killing nuclear scientist, vows response ‘in due time’

For the second time in a year, Iran has to confront the question of how to respond to provocation. After Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader Major-General Qassem Soleimani was killed by an American drone strike in January, Tehran said it would choose when and how to exact revenge. The answer came via a barrage of missiles aimed at US troops in Iraq – in keeping with Tehran’s policy of “strategic patience”.

Today, however, the circumstances are different, and time is no longer on the Islamic republic’s side.

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Next US president will have to give in to Iran, Rouhani says

Next US president will have to give in to Iran, Rouhani says

Fakhrizadeh’s assassination followed a series of alleged cyberattacks on Iranian nuclear sites’ control systems, and a string of mysterious explosions in military hardware depots around the country. Three months ago, Abu Muhammad al-Masri – believed to be al-Qaida’s second in command – was gunned down in the streets of Tehran.

These incidents have unnerved ordinary Iranians and exposed the regime’s inability to maintain security within its borders. Tehran’s options will now be severely narrowed as it looks to exact revenge, and address its perceived failings, within a short period of time.

What happens next will reflect the regime’s interpretation of the attacks. If, as has been reported, it sees them as an attempt by Israel to ignite a war in the waning days of the Trump administration, one can expect only moderate retaliation that does not pose the risk of spilling over into the rest of the Middle East and beyond. This could take the form of a cyberattack aimed at crippling a highly visible target, such as an Israeli ministry.

If Iran prefers more bang for its buck, a missile strike in the general vicinity of US troops – such as the one following Soleimani’s killing – could be an option, despite its limited effectiveness. Such a hit would probably be carried out by Iran’s revolutionary guards for maximum control over the use of force, and to avoid negative side-effects.
US soldiers and journalists stand near a crater caused by Iranian bombing at Ain al-Asad air base in Iraq, carried out in retaliation for the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. Photo: AP
A strike carried out by Iranian proxies that operate from Lebanon to Iraq would be less preferred, as restraining them could prove to be difficult – and anything less than precision and control could justify an immediate and more severe counter strike from Israel or the US, both of whom appear to be spoiling for a fight as President Donald Trump’s time in power comes to an end.

The other side of the coin is the regime’s perception of its own grip on power and whether it aims to re-enter negotiations over a new nuclear deal with the incoming Biden administration. If the leadership needs to avoid appearing weak to shore up internal cohesion, a big show of force is needed. Iran has a plethora of options in this regard, most of which can be assigned to its proxies.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Tehran has mastered a military doctrine of low-intensity conflict to achieve its strategic and operational objectives. Iran’s asymmetrical response encompasses a wide range of non-state actors – Hezbollah in Lebanon, popular mobilisation units in Iraq, the Syrian National Defence Force, and the Houthis in Yemen, to name just a few.

This network of influence includes proxies with different degrees of capabilities and allegiance to Iran. Nevertheless, it is an integral part of Iran’s security doctrine, alongside more conventional capabilities such as advanced ballistic missiles, long-range armed drones, and cyberwarfare.

US President-elect Joe Biden’s credibility will be severely strained if he enters into talks with an Iranian regime that continues to threaten American interests. Photo: AFP
However, resorting to such actions could take negotiations with the US off the table in future. President-elect Joe Biden’s credibility will be severely strained if he enters into talks with a regime that continues to threaten American interests.
Iran, which has been devastated by Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, is desperate for relief and a fresh start with a new US government – so mobilising its proxies may prove to be a bridge too far. Internal politics could still upset the apple cart, though: hardliners are in the ascendancy and they are steadfastly opposed to any sort of deal with the “Great Satan”, especially after having already been left at the altar by the US once. A looming Iranian presidential election in 2021 only serves to further muddy the waters.

Iran assassination could undercut Joe Biden‘s diplomatic options

Despite the Middle East’s transition to new regional security architecture, the Iranian nuclear programme is slowly, but inexorably, moving back into the spotlight.

Given the high stakes involved – and the fact that the United Nations and Germany, among others, are calling for restraint – some form of moderate retaliation by the Islamic republic is the most logical outcome. But this is still 2020, and stranger things have happened.

Dr Alessandro Arduino is the Principal Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute-National University of Singapore.

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