South China Sea: Marcos has resisted drastic moves so far, but for how long?

Calls in the Philippines are growing, for measures from building a lighthouse on Second Thomas Shoal to inundating China with litigation

Richard Heydarian

Published: 5:30am, 13 Jul 2024

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Soon after his landslide victory in 2022, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr vowed not to allow “a single millimetre” of the nation’s coastal rights to be “trampled upon”. Crucially, he invoked the “very important” 2016 Hague ruling which rejected the bulk of China’s expansive claims over the South China Sea.

“We will use it to continue to assert our territorial rights. It is not a claim. It is already our territorial right,” he said, emphasising the final and binding nature of the tribunal award. China, which refused to participate in the international court’s proceedings, has flatly rejected the decision as “just a piece of waste paper”.

Guided by realpolitik, Marcos Jnr has made clear the Philippines “cannot go to war” over the South China Sea and will “talk to China consistently with a firm voice” – a position that has guided his foreign policy over the past two years. But nearly a decade after the arbitration award and with increasing – and increasingly violent – clashes in the disputed waters, there is growing pressure for him to adopt more radical measures.

Some strategists have pushed for Manila to open a second arbitration case against China while others suggest a full alignment with the United States and other Western powers in a brewing cold war against China. By all indications, however, Marcos is determined to pursue a middle course, combining military deterrence and diplomatic engagement to protect the interests of the Philippines.

But a symphony of misunderstandings haunts bilateral relations. On Beijing’s part, Manila’s leadership has been duplicitous and/or aiding a US-led containment strategy in Asia. Accordingly, the Philippine decision to file an arbitration case against China while welcoming an expanded American military presence on its soil in the early 2010s are seen as part of a greater Washington-led geopolitical plot.

Chinese authorities have also accused the Marcos administration of betraying prior agreements, including an alleged promise not to fortify Philippine military facilities in disputed areas such as the Second Thomas Shoal.

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From the Philippines’ perspective, its actions are driven by two primary considerations: domestic public opinion and the need to establish some deterrence capability against a far more powerful neighbour. Surveys over the past decade show most Filipinos prefer a tough and uncompromising stance on the South China Sea, a position shared by the bulk of the Philippines’ American-trained defence establishment.

Moreover, the Philippines’ historical reliance on America is a function of its underdeveloped defensive capabilities. Against China and its massive navy, the asymmetry is particularly dire. China’s coastguard boasts humongous vessels, notably the “monster” cutter 5901, which is over five times as large as the Philippine coastguard’s flagship vessel, BRP Teresa Magbanua.

The escalating tensions have exposed cracks in Manila’s South China Sea strategy. Fearing a Chinese takeover of Second Thomas Shoal, hardliners are pushing for drastic measures beyond the “transparency initiative”, which largely focuses on proactive diplomacy and exposing China’s intimidation tactics. Some experts are pushing for the construction of a “concrete facility”, such as a lighthouse, over the shoal, and the deployment of larger and faster boats for resupply missions to the Philippine military.

Meanwhile, former chief justice Antonio Carpio, one of the architects of the 2016 arbitration case, has called for additional arbitration cases – zeroing in on the environmental impact of China’s reclamation and fishing activities within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Should China reject any adverse arbitral ruling, the former magistrate has advocated for seizure of overseas Chinese assets as compensation.

But Marcos has shied away from a new round of legal warfare against China, recognising that such move may cause more harm than good by potentially provoking an armed confrontation. So far, he has only been dangling potential arbitration as a bargaining chip.

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There are growing calls in the Philippines to grant the US maximal access to Philippine facilities under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to deter China. Some Filipino strategists have even called for more direct involvement on the Taiwan question by jointly preparing for – if not actively deterring – any potential contingencies.

But Marcos has sought to calibrate the American military presence in the Philippines as leverage in dealing with China.

It explains why he has repeatedly pushed back against any suggestion that EDCA bases in northern Philippines will be used for America’s Taiwan-related operations. His strategically ambiguous stance is meant to enhance his country’s strategic space, to allow it to play the two superpowers against each other on the Taiwan issue.

If anything, the Marcos administration is intent on maintaining a broad degree of independence in its foreign policy by avoiding an overreliance on America. Military chief General Romeo Brawner recently made clear the Philippines turned down America’s offer of help in the resupply and patrol operations in the disputed waters.

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Instead, the Philippines is seeking to develop a broad network of security partnerships with like-minded powers. Accordingly, it has stepped up its defence spending and strategic cooperation with key defence equipment suppliers such as India and South Korea. The Philippines has also signed a reciprocal access agreement with Japan to facilitate joint military drills and weapons transfers, while pursuing similar pacts with France, New Zealand and a number of other Indo-Pacific nations.

The ultimate aim of the Marcos administration is to steer clear of US-China rivalry while acquiring sufficient strategic capital and defence capabilities to more effectively negotiate a mutually acceptable modus vivendi in the South China Sea. But if maritime tensions continue to exacerbate, the ever-cautious Filipino president might be forced to consider more drastic measures to uphold his country’s core interests.

Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific”, and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”