Nato needs allies in Asia but does it need an Indo-Pacific presence?
- Nato members have vested interests in the region, individually and collectively, but an alliance expansion would raise complicated questions over collective defence and overreach
While Nato has no formal remit in the Indo-Pacific, its members have security and defence arrangements with regional partners, reflecting the inextricable links between both regions. The 1951 ANZUS Treaty, for instance, for all its ambiguity, denotes a “common” response from Australia, New Zealand and the United States should any party be attacked within the Asia-Pacific.
A slew of new minilateral security arrangements have emerged in the Indo-Pacific, further complicating the likelihood of entangling alliances leading to Nato intervention.
This raises the question of the strength of the link between the two spheres of European and Asia-Pacific security – would an extra-regional attack on US forces in Asia warrant a response from its European allies and Canada? It highlights a fundamental issue facing a potential alliance cohesion in response to an Indo-Pacific crisis.
Though Nato states may feel inclined to support the US and regional partners, it is unclear whether Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty extends to an extra-regional “armed attack”. Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean, for instance, is excluded from Nato assurances despite being a sovereign US territory. Geographical limitations could have a significant impact on a Nato-wide response when it comes to its members’ operations in the Indo-Pacific.
This highlights the urgent need for Nato to plan accordingly as Indo-Pacific tensions grow. The Vilnius summit last summer has strengthened Nato’s resolve in the Indo-Pacific. That meeting saw the creation of individually tailored partnership programmes for the “Asia-Pacific 4” aimed at addressing security concerns – namely China’s expanding presence in the region.
Cooperation and the avoidance of conflict is also an economic imperative for European Nato members, as an estimated 40 per cent of the European Union’s foreign trade transits through the South China Sea to access East Asian markets. The question is how European Nato powers can engage in constructive relations with Indo-Pacific allies without being automatically folded into US efforts to preserve regional influence.
European countries are not as keen to take on China as the US, leading to some friction within Nato. There is a legitimate concern that Nato expanding into the Indo-Pacific is an overextension while a hot conflict is active on the European continent.
Benedict Baxendale-Smith is a doctoral researcher at King’s College London in the Defence Studies Department, and the Cuthbert Collingwood associate fellow in maritime strategy at the Council on Geostrategy
Jason C. Moyer is a programme associate for the Global Europe programme at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars