The aborted mutiny in Russia by the Wagner private mercenary group, led by its chief and financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, sent a clear signal to Chinese President Xi Jinping: China’s “no limits” partnership with a revisionist Russia under Vladimir Putin, devised by the two sides as a counterweight against the United States and its Western allies, is a risky bet.
The Ukraine war has been degrading Russia’s geopolitical, military and economic potential. As many observers expected, the reverberations of Putin’s military adventure are also being felt in Russia domestically. The armed offensive launched by Prigozhin, with his private troops coming as close as 200km of Moscow, showed that a civil war in Russia propelled by repeated Russian military setbacks in Ukraine is no longer implausible.
Marginalised by the West for its aggression in Ukraine, a Russia affected by internal instability and political infighting cannot play a significant international role. This is especially true of Moscow’s confrontation with the West, which is China’s primary focus in its engagement with the Kremlin.
Indeed, the first signs of Russia’s waning international influence are emerging. Last week, Kazakhstan said it would stop hosting discussions between Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iran aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict, a move which reportedly surprised the Kremlin.
This suggests that even Russia’s traditional partners such as the post-Soviet nations of Central Asia are increasingly uneasy at the prospect of remaining embroiled in Russia’s geopolitical dynamics. It is not by chance that Central Asian leaders, who from the outset have looked with suspicion on Putin’s military operation against Ukraine, and are leaning ever more towards political and economic ties with China, have avoided commenting publicly on the situation in Russia.
If Russia continues to weaken internally, it will not be able to project power abroad and will be poised to lose influence even in its traditional backyard.
Apart from in Central Asia, Moscow is ceding ground in the South Caucasus to actors such as Turkey, Israel, India, the European Union and the US.
Furthermore, persistent territorial tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have intensified since Putin’s attack against Ukraine, risk undermining the Russian partnership with Iran. Tehran traditionally supports the Armenians to contain Azerbaijan’s military expansion, and a Russia distracted by the Ukraine war might be unable to rein in Azerbaijani attempts to secure a land corridor to Turkish territory.
There is likely to be more to come. The uncertain destiny of Prigozhin and his Wagner Group might imperil Putin’s plan to exert influence in Africa, where his former ally’s private military company has significant interests.
If the Putin-Prigozhin feud were to export further instability to the African continent, China could see a threat to its economic interests there, not to mention that Beijing will have to explain to its African partners, part of the Global South that Xi is courting in response to the US system of global alliances, why it continues to back such a destabilising actor as the Russian president.
05:43
Putin calls Wagner revolt a betrayal as militia group leader denies mobilisation was coup attempt
Putin calls Wagner revolt a betrayal as militia group leader denies mobilisation was coup attempt
China usually takes a cautious stance on domestic crises in other countries. On June 25, after Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko met Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, the Chinese foreign ministry put out a brief statement, saying the Wagner revolt was an internal issue and that “China supports Russia in maintaining national stability”. The lack of an explicit mention of Putin in the statement could be read as reflecting the Chinese leadership’s disappointment with how the Russian president is managing the events unfolding in his country and the conflict with Ukraine.
It is in Beijing’s fundamental interests that the top leadership in the Kremlin is able to ensure the smooth functioning of the Russian state, its territorial integrity and, accordingly, the control of its arsenal of nuclear weapons.
06:16
Who is Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of Russia’s Wagner Group revolt?
Who is Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of Russia’s Wagner Group revolt?
A civil war in Russia would further destabilise the world economy, a grim prospect for China which is grappling with economic challenges at home. For instance, if internal disorder were to extend to Eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far East, it would also imperil fossil fuel supplies to China through the Power of Siberia gas pipeline and the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil conduit. Russia is keen to move forward with a second Power of Siberia pipeline to deliver natural gas to China, but instability could threaten that project.
If the Chinese government is merely suspected of being hesitant to recalibrate its special relationship with the Kremlin, some Chinese businesses are already hedging against their exposure to the Russian market. After news about the Wagner Group rebellion started circulating on Saturday, several companies in southern China reportedly stopped shipments of goods to Russia.
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States has partially shifted its attention and resources from the Taiwan Strait and the China seas to Eastern Europe, a tactical gain for Beijing that it would not wish to lose.
The best situation for China is to have Putin firmly in power. As such a scenario is not assured, Beijing needs a Plan B to at least try to contain the spillover effects of a possible collapse of the Putin regime. Working with partners in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, especially Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian republics, to create a sort of cordon sanitaire along Russia’s borders would seem to be a more viable option for the Chinese leadership.
Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst
