Germany’s national security strategy is not a paradigm shift on China
- Taken at face value, the strategy offers a welcome dose of reality, but the lack of specificity and the repetition of mantras suggests it heralds little change
- Instead, Germany appears content to continue the Sino-German status quo while trying to appease the US with harsh criticism of China
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz praised the strategy as a significant change. Driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of Sino-German relations, international pressure has mounted on Berlin to stop being reactive and become more proactive in addressing threats on the global stage.
Taken at face value, the strategy offers a welcome dose of reality. The German government openly addresses the fact that for the foreseeable future, Europe’s security will have to be defended against – and not with – Russia, while China is clearly cast as a threat to global security that warrants economic and political de-risking.
However, as is so often the case, the devil is in the detail. For example, referring to the issues of development cooperation, cybersecurity and the protection of supply chains, Scholz said the plan involved “meshing together all means and instruments to strengthen Germany’s security against external threats”. However, he did not explain exactly how Germany aims to achieve this.
Instead, it sounded more like a mere repetition of his commitments during his Zeitenwende speech in February 2022. The proclamation that Russia has become the “greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region” for the foreseeable future falls under the same premise.
Added to the repetition of mantras in the security strategy is a blatant vagueness. On the subject of Ukraine, for example, Germany promises to continue its support for “as long as it is necessary”, but there has been no word on how to ensure Ukraine’s security once a ceasefire or a peace treaty has been agreed.
The US and China in particular will have paid close attention to the strategy document. After all, how Germany and the European Union plan to maintain their relations with a rising China while tensions between Beijing and Washington – the EU’s most crucial ally – continue to deteriorate is a pressing question.
While Germany has yet to publish a separate China strategy document, the lack of clarity shows two things in particular. First, Berlin understands that de-risking is OK but that decoupling would be a grave mistake. Such a step would be associated with significantly higher costs, given that China remains Germany’s biggest trading partner. Berlin is acutely aware that no other market could come close to compensating German businesses in a decoupling scenario.
Germany and China’s 50-year relationship takes a disappointing turn
As sensible as Germany’s stance on China seems at this stage, the strategy largely ignores questions of its own implementation, and it seems unrealistic that Berlin can achieve the goal of a security policy from a single source without a National Security Council. Germany’s national security strategy thus leaves much to be desired in a geopolitical leadership sense.
It now seems apparent, however, that Berlin has made the conscious decision to continue the Sino-German status quo and try to chew gum and walk at the same time. It hopes not to get entangled in the US-China stand-off, to continue to harvest the benefits of a fruitful economic relationship with China and to make gestures towards appeasing Washington with stark criticism of Beijing.
Thomas O. Falk is a UK-based independent journalist and political analyst