With firm allies like Japan and Australia, the US can afford to take its eye off the Indo-Pacific when it needs to
The US has a unique advantage over China in the region: a strong support system during times of strain or when domestic issues demand attention
In the Indo-Pacific, Japan remains a torch-bearer protector of US strategic interests, along with Australia, with the South Asia strategy outsourced to India
US President Joe Biden recently backed out of a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue summit in Australia, instead meeting Quad leaders briefly on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Japan. This decision was prompted by urgent debt ceiling talks in Washington. Some analysts suggest this divided attention reflects America’s reduced commitment to the Indo-Pacific – but this may be only partially true.
Since identifying China as a major competitor, the US has indeed focused on “America first”, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Asean region.
Policies, including the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Chips and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act, aim to retain a competitive edge over China in strategic defence and tech sectors, even as the US has urged its allies and partners to de-risk their supply chains away from China. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework was yet another effort, though it failed to offer its Southeast Asian members the coveted reduced-tariff access to the US market.
These actions suggest a self-focused approach that may not adequately prioritise the Indo-Pacific.
But it would be unfair to overlook Washington’s efforts to revitalise minilateral groupings, such as the Quad and Aukus alliance, and consequently the improved ties between Japan and South Korea.
With a broad network of allies and partners, the United States has a unique advantage over China: a strong support system during times of strain or when domestic issues demand attention.
From the left, US President Joe Biden, Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi hold a Quad meeting on the sidelines of the G7 summit, at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, western Japan, on May 20. Photo: AP
At the G7 summit in Hiroshima, leaders discussed the launch of a Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to counter pressure from China through an early-warning system and information-sharing. This aligns with the US policy of de-risking economic relations with China.
The Quad meeting espoused similar issues about upholding the rule of law, countering China’s military and economic intimidation and promoting free trade in the region.
Should Japan and South Korea establish a trilateral alliance with the US, they could coordinate their security and economic strategies to curb China’s influence. Experts note that this “ganging up” stems from Beijing’s failure to restrain North Korea’s build-up of missiles and nuclear arms.
Next year, Nato’s first office in Asia will open in Tokyo, a significant step towards strengthening political and security ties among nations worried about China, North Korea and Russia’s escalating military capabilities and coercion.
Japan has been a torch-bearer protector of America’s strategic interests in the region, with or without direct US involvement. It was Japan that first introduced the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which the Trump administration adopted as the centrepiece of its national security strategy in 2017.
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Protests over nukes as G7 leaders talk Ukraine and China in Hiroshima
Protests over nukes as G7 leaders talk Ukraine and China in Hiroshima
While the US lags behind China in regional infrastructure investments, Japan has launched projects such as the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and Japan-Asean Connectivity Initiative. The partnership, initiated in 2015 with about US$110 billion, provides long-term loans with low interest rates to promote transparency, debt sustainability and environmental responsibility.
In 2020, Japan pulled its transport and logistics projects across land, maritime and air corridors in Southeast Asia into the Japan-Asean initiative, valued at US$20 billion. Last March, it committed a further US$75 billion to infrastructure financing for the Global South, under the free and open Indo-Pacific vision.
Tokyo has also committed US$100 million to the third iteration of the Japan-Asean Integration Fund, targeting key areas such as maritime cooperation, disaster management, transnational crime and cybersecurity within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Importantly, Japan is a key part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes the 10-member Asean. Japan is also Asean’s major trading partner, with bilateral trade crossing US$240 billion in 2021, and the third-largest country investor in the region, after the US and China.
Japan has used this economic leverage to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asia. In a significant policy departure, Tokyo last month pledged military aid to “like-minded” nations, having provided coastguard vessels and maritime capabilities to Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia under existing partnerships.
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Japan to offer military aid to ally nations in historic departure from post-WWII military pacifism
Japan to offer military aid to ally nations in historic departure from post-WWII military pacifism
Last February, Tokyo and Manila agreed to joint training exercises for humanitarian and disaster relief operations, potentially enabling military deployments on each other’s soil. This agreement may also serve as a model for Japan’s military pacts with other Southeast Asian countries.
Spurred on by growing economic initiatives and security ties, Japan now seeks to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership with Asean. By emphasising a rules-based order and enabling regional countries to reduce their economic dependence on China, Japan’s actions resonate with US interests in the region.
Australia, another American ally, is also diplomatically active in the region, seeking acceptance for its growing security role. As a result, in addition to the original supporters of Australian naval patrols, including the possibility of nuclear-powered submarines, other Asean members have softened their opposition.
Australia has also urged Asean to guard against any one country dominating the region, a stance that favours Washington.
In South Asia, Washington has prioritised relations with India to protect its strategic interests vis-à-vis China, despite criticism. New Delhi has been building economic and military ties with regional countries such as Bangladesh, where it has gained greater influence than the US and China. While some neighbours might perceive the US-India strategic partnership as sidelining their security concerns, a strong India serves US interests against China.
New Delhi is not expected to come to Washington’s military defence but the US values India’s independent capability to balance China and complicate its threat calculations. Outsourcing the South Asia strategy benefits long-term US strategic interests.
With allies like these, the US can afford to take its eyes off the region when it has to, to concentrate on putting out domestic fires.
Riaz Khokhar is a policy associate at the Center for Regional and Global Connectivity at Tabadlab, Islamabad, and a former Asia Studies visiting fellow at the East-West Center in Washington
