A family walks on the street in Shanghai on January 31. China’s government has confirmed the country’s population shrank in 2022 for the first time in 60 years, leading to a flurry of concern about China’s demographic future and what it means for its economy and that of the wider world. Photo: EPA-EFE
Opinion
Yi Fuxian
Yi Fuxian
Without overcoming its fertility challenge, China risks dying out before it gets rich
Chinese policymakers must somehow implement policies to revive interest in marriage and reduce the cost of raising children without crashing the economy
But even if they increase the number of births, they will almost certainly be unable to reverse demographic trends that have taken hold across the globe
China’s population decline, which the central government officially confirmed in January, has led many observers to wonder if the country’s current demographic trends threaten its stability.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s population shrank last year for the first time in 60 years, nine years earlier than government projections had anticipated. The total fertility rate fell to about 1.1 births per woman, well below the official forecast of 1.8. Most notably, the number of births dropped sharply to 9.56 million, the fewest since 1790, despite China’s shift to a two-child policy in 2016.
But this sharp drop in the number of births is an illusion caused by an exaggeration of pre-2020 numbers. For example, a sample survey from 2016 showed a fertility rate of 1.25 and only 13 million births, which was later inflated to 18.83 million. The United Nations’ 2022 World Population Prospects (WPP) suggests China’s population began declining last year, whereas I estimate the decline began in 2018. The latest WPP also predicted that China’s population would fall to 767 million in 2100, far below its earlier forecast of 1.065 billion.
The UN projections still overestimate China’s population. While the 2022 WPP puts the Chinese population at 1.43 billion people, I estimate it is now smaller than 1.28 billion.
The 2022 WPP also exaggerates China’s future population, predicting a fertility rate of 1.31 for 2023-50 and 1.45 for 2051-2100. The fertility rate among Chinese in the region suggests otherwise. Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Chinese Singaporeans have all had average fertility rates of 1.0 to 1.1 – among the lowest in the world – in the past two decades despite local authorities’ pronatalist policies.
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China reports first population decline in 6 decades, with birth rate at record low in 2022
China reports first population decline in 6 decades, with birth rate at record low in 2022
China’s efforts to boost its fertility rate face major challenges. The one-child policy has reshaped the Chinese economy, dramatically increasing the cost of raising children. China’s household disposable income is equivalent to only 44 per cent of its GDP, compared to 72 per cent in the United States and 65 per cent in the United Kingdom. The Chinese housing market was valued at four times the country’s GDP in 2020, whereas the US real estate market was valued at 1.6 times GDP.
Chinese policymakers now face a dilemma. If the real estate bubble does not burst, young couples will be unable to afford to raise two children. If the bubble does burst, China’s economy will slow and a global financial crisis will erupt. Likewise, raising household disposable income to 60 to 70 per cent of GDP to increase fertility could reduce the government’s power.
Given these difficult trade-offs, Chinese policymakers might be more inclined to replicate Japanese policies to lower child-rearing costs. These include reducing school fees and providing convenient childcare, childbirth subsidies and housing benefits to young couples.
But Japan’s approach has proved expensive and ineffective. The country’s fertility rate received a temporary boost, rising from 1.26 in 2005 to 1.45 in 2015 before falling back to 1.23 in 2022. Moreover, because it is “getting old before it gets rich”, China lacks the financial wherewithal to emulate Japan.
From 2013 to 2021, the number of first marriages fell by more than half, and by three-quarters among 20- to 24-year-olds. The one-child policy, which was in place for 35 years, has irreversibly changed Chinese views of childbearing: having one child – or none – has become the social norm.
The more recent the cohort of Chinese women, the less willing to have children they seem to be. One recent survey found that while the average number of intended children among women in China was 1.64, the average decreased to 1.54 for women born after 1990 and 1.48 for women born after 2000.
For comparison, in South Korea and Hong Kong, the average intended number of children is 1.92 and 1.41, respectively. Both fertility rates are roughly half the intended figures. If this declining interest in childbearing is any indication, China will struggle to stabilise its fertility rate at 0.8, and its population will fall to less than 1.02 billion by 2050 and 310 million in 2100.
Ancient China also experienced population declines because of war and famine but recovered quickly, similar to blood loss with normal regeneration. Modern population declines, like aplastic anaemia, are hard to recover from.
Even if China succeeds in increasing its fertility rate to 1.1 and prevents it from declining, its population is likely to fall to 1.08 billion by 2050 and 440 million by 2100. The country’s share of the world’s population, which fell from 37 per cent in 1820 to 22 per cent in 1950-80, will fall to 11 per cent in 2050 and 4 per cent by 2100.
The effects of this population decline will be compounded by rapid ageing, which will slow Chinese growth and is likely to increase government debt. The share of Chinese people aged 65 and older will rise from about 14 per cent in 2020 to 35 per cent in 2050.
By that point, China’s pension crisis will develop into a humanitarian catastrophe. Women, who tend to live longer than men on average and are usually a few years younger than their spouses, will ultimately pay the price for this painful demographic shift.
Yi Fuxian, a senior scientist in obstetrics and gynaecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, is the author of Big Country with an Empty Nest. Copyright:Project Syndicate
