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Activists from India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) take part in a demonstration in Bhubaneshwar on December 17, 2022. BJP supporters set fire to an effigy of Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari during a protest against remarks he made about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a press conference at the United Nations. Photo: AFP
Opinion
Abdul Basit
Abdul Basit

From Taliban’s return to Hindutva’s spread, terrorism and extremism in South Asia have become more fragmented

  • While geopolitical developments and the Covid-19 pandemic pushed terrorism down South Asian countries’ priority list, its spread has continued
  • The Taliban’s return had a relatively limited impact, though the Pakistani Taliban kept up its insurgency and evidence emerged of Hindutva’s global presence

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, US-China global rivalry and economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic have pushed terrorism down the priority list of several South Asian states. However, terrorism not only persisted in South Asia in 2022 but expanded and diversified, both ideologically and operationally.

Consequently, South Asia’s extremist trends in 2022 looked fragmented and complex. They benefited from existing sociopolitical fault lines, religious polarisation, shrinking space for dissent and civil liberties and states’ oppression of the media, often using counterterrorism laws as a weapon.

The year’s most telling trend was the declining salience of Afghanistan in South Asia’s extremist landscape. Historically, Afghanistan has been an agent of change in the region, from the Mongols’ invasion in the 13th century to the 1979 Russian military invasion that paved the way for the rise of jihadist proxy groups and the US-led global “war on terror”.

Aside from Pakistan, the Taliban’s return to power did not have a major effect on other South Asian countries.

Not only was the impact of the Taliban’s return limited and uneven across South Asia, it was largely intangible. It was confined to an outpouring of ideological sympathy for the Taliban on social media and a triumphant narrative of reliving the victory. However, no militant group in the region outside Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emulated the Taliban’s model of insurgency.
In 2022, radical ideologies in South Asia expanded from jihadist militancy to ethno-nationalist narratives of Hindutva extremism. Under the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, Hindutva as an ideology and its proponents have seen phenomenal growth in India.

In 2022, there was an outward growth of Hindutva beyond India both in the cyber and physical domains. Hindutva radicals have harassed and intimidated those critical of Hindutva.

For instance, radical Hindu groups wrote threatening letters and emails to academics and intellectuals in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand who critiqued Hindutva’s anti-minority rhetoric based on conspiracy theories such as “love jihad”. In Australia, 13 academics resigned from the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne over the Indian High Commission’s interference, including efforts to censor their research work.
People from human rights organisations rally in Bangalore, India, on December 1, 2020, against the BJP-led government’s “love jihad” rhetoric. Photo: EPA-EFE
In August, the Indian Business Association was censured for bringing out bulldozers featuring posters of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath on two India Day parades in the US state of New Jersey. The bulldozer has emerged as a symbol of anti-Muslim activity in India over its use in demolishing Muslim activists’ homes and property.
Similarly, the communal violence triggered by Hindu radicals in the UK and Canada brings into sharp focus Hindutva’s global growth.
Meanwhile, Hindutva radicals involved in hate crimes have been held up as heroes in India. Vishal Sood, an Indian university student in Australia, is a case in point. Sood was arrested and subsequently deported for a series of attacks on members of the Sikh community. On his return to India, he received a hero’s welcome.

Last year also saw the diversification of ideological narratives of Hindutva and jihadist extremism. The “Trads versus Raitas” debate within Hindutva ideological space epitomises this trend. Trads refers to an online subculture of the Hindutva movement which is ultraradical. This group regards mainstream Hindutva ideologues and figures as soft on religious minorities in India and calls them Raitas.

02:40

Muslims around world condemn ‘Islamophobic’ remarks by India’s ruling party spokeswoman

Muslims around world condemn ‘Islamophobic’ remarks by India’s ruling party spokeswoman
For instance, Trads refer to Modi as “Maulana Modi” for accepting the demands of protesting Sikh farmers and suspending BJP spokeswoman Nupur Sharma over her offensive remarks against the Prophet Mohammed. Trads imitate the Western far-right’s online trolling culture to couch their anti-minority narratives and trivialise violence.
Similarly, the ideological debates among jihadist militants in 2022 were split between the narratives of the Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan (Isis-K). Since the Taliban returned to power, Isis-K has tried to delegitimise it by questioning its claims of establishing a sharia government in Afghanistan. Likewise, Isis-K has criticised the Taliban’s style of governance, diplomacy and foreign relations – particularly with the West and China.

For its part, the Taliban refers to Isis-K as “Kharijites” – rebels or criminals – and is trying to crush the group.

In their physical and ideological contest, Isis-K and the Taliban are trying to win the support of local jihadist groups such as the TTP, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, among others.

03:16

Rare look inside Taliban’s eye-for-an-eye sharia justice system

Rare look inside Taliban’s eye-for-an-eye sharia justice system

Other noteworthy trends in South Asia last year include hybrid militancy in Indian Kashmir and the resurgence of the TTP in Pakistan.

Hybrid or “faceless militancy” signifies a new phase of anti-state violence in Kashmir involving locals who use light weapons instead of assault rifles and melt away in the population after the attacks. Given their anonymous nature, it is difficult to spot and eliminate hybrid militants.

Meanwhile, the TTP’s resurgence in Pakistan is a direct result of the powerful military establishment’s myopic policy of supporting the Taliban’s return to power and counterproductive peace talks that allowed the TTP to regain territory.

Terrorism has not only persisted in South Asia but metastasised operationally and ideologically. While 2022’s trends highlight the local and cross-border nature of terrorism in the region, they can undermine already fragile interstate relations.

Unfortunately, the absence of functioning regional counterterrorism mechanisms, growing social and political polarisation, poorly governed spaces and state patronage will provide extremist groups enough latitude to evolve and stay relevant in 2023.

Abdul Basit is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter: @basitresearcher

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