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Municipality workers in protective suits spray disinfectant at the iconic Grand Bazaar in Istanbul amid the coronavirus pandemic. Photo: AP

No one should be surprised by Turkey’s recent economic and financial woes. The country’s triple crisis (currency, banking and sovereign debt) has been unfolding for years. Whether this economic turmoil will incite political turmoil is now a widely debated question.

Prolonged high inflation and widening deficits were stalking the Turkish economy even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit. For over a decade, inflation expectations have exceeded the 5 per cent target by more than half. And the Turkish lira has been depreciating against the US dollar since late 2017, with a 20 per cent decline in August 2018.

Aggressive policy accommodation during the pandemic, an unsustainable policy mix that relied on excessive credit growth, and the sale of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves to offset the impact of capital outflows generated further vulnerabilities. This led to a further 40 per cent loss in the lira’s value since last January.

In November, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appointed a new finance minister and central bank governor. Subsequently, the country’s monetary policy framework underwent a long-overdue normalisation and the lira regained 10 per cent of its lost value by the end of the year.

Turkey has maintained a floating exchange rate since 2001. It adopted an inflation-targeting regime, under which policy rates should not be adjusted to engineer currency appreciation or depreciation.

A man checks foreign exchange rates outside a currency exchange shop in Istanbul in August 2018, when the Turkish lira declined 20 per cent against the US dollar. Photo: AP
A man checks foreign exchange rates outside a currency exchange shop in Istanbul in August 2018, when the Turkish lira declined 20 per cent against the US dollar. Photo: AP
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