Responses to Xinjiang ethnic unrest do not address underlying causes

The recent outburst of violence in Xinjiang, where 35 people were killed, occurred near the upcoming fourth anniversary of the July 2009 riots which resulted in a death toll of 197 individuals, along with 1,721 injured. It begs the question: what has changed in the past four years? And, are we to expect further violence in the near future?

Occupying one-sixth of the total land mass of China, Xinjiang possesses some of the nation’s largest natural gas and oil reserves, and is strategically situated as a distributor of these resources to energy-hungry Central Asia, and surrounding Chinese provinces. Suffice to say, relations in Xinjiang between the nearly 8.4 million Uygurs and Han Chinese (the predominant ethnic group) have been tense over the years; and the government is keen to pacify any ethnic tensions, especially given its geo-economic position.

A notable departure from the response of the 2009 riots is that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Yu Zhengsheng (who heads the National People’s Congress) are taking an increasingly active leadership role. This could signify a new determination to ensure party control and oversight of the security apparatus when it comes to ethnic issues, with a reduced role for the Central Politics and Law Commission and its head, Meng Jianzhu. In this scenario, Meng answers to Yu; the equivalent was not the case with Zhou Yongkang, Meng’s predecessor, under the Hu Jintao administration.

Despite this apparent shift, the government’s response to repeated expressions of Uygur unrest continues to consist of oscillating soft and hard policies. The soft approach is exemplified by the activities of the Chinese Islamic Association, which mainly involves the building and upkeep of mosques. There are more than 20,000 mosques in Xinjiang, according to the State Council Information Office, which makes this endeavour relatively significant. The hard approach is represented by increasing the visible security presence, as well as “re-educating” and “reforming” religious leaders to ensure they do not advocate Islamic “fundamentalism” or “radicalism” as defined by the state, or forge connections between the nearly 21 million Muslims in China and elsewhere.

The present response to the recent violence mainly follows the hard approach. As further proof: there is currently a grid system being rolled out across Xinjiang to “manage social control”. In Urumqi, for instance, this system includes 40,000 riot-proof HD cameras, 600 policing boxes and 756 inspection routes patrolled 24 hours a day.