China-Pakistan projects won’t be safe if local feelings are ignored

The latest deadly attack on Chinese nationals in Pakistan is likely to shift the focus of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Beijing
Pakistan must address socioeconomic grievances on the ground to save lives and keep future projects with China on the table

Abdul Basit

Published: 5:30am, 31 Mar 2024

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On March 26, a suicide bomber rammed a car filled with explosives into a convoy of Chinese engineers who worked on the Dasu hydropower project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, northwest Pakistan. The attack killed five Chinese engineers and their driver. Chinese diplomats asked Islamabad to launch a thorough investigation, punish the perpetrators and take steps to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens.

The attack comes on the heels of the Balochistan Liberation Army’s (BLA) failed attempt to enter the Gwadar Port Authority complex on March 20. The complex houses Chinese workers and engineers, as well as Pakistani intelligence offices.

Gwadar, in Balochistan province, is the culmination point of the 3,000-kilometre China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a centrepiece of the Belt and Road Initiative which starts in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. CPEC comprises rail, road, energy and other infrastructure projects.

In the first two years after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, attacks rose by 73 per cent in Pakistan, leaving the country in a tailspin. The Taliban’s takeover had a revitalising impact on jihadist groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as well as Baloch separatist groups.

Tuesday’s bombing was one of the most devastating attacks targeting Chinese nationals since April 2022, when suicide bomber Shari Baloch attacked the University of Karachi’s Confucius Institute. Last August, militants in Gwadar targeted a bus of Chinese engineers who all survived.

The Majeed Brigade, the BLA’s suicide squad, has carried out terrorist attacks against Chinese economic interests, workers and engineers in Pakistan since 2018.

People attend a candlelight vigil on April 28, 2022 to remember the victims killed in a suicide bombing that targeted the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University. Photo: EPA-EFE

Most major anti-China terrorist attacks in Pakistan have been carried out by the Majeed Brigade, including those on a bus in Dalbandin and the Chinese consulate in Karachi in 2018, as well as the 2019 assault on the Pearl Continental hotel frequented by Chinese nationals. The brigade also claimed responsibility for the 2020 Pakistan Stock Exchange and 2022 Confucius Institute attacks. Militants carried out two other attacks but they either did not claim them or sent mixed messages about their intentions.

TTP claimed responsibility for the Quetta Serena hotel bombing in 2021 but walked back its claim of targeting foreign officials. The hotel was hosting then-Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Nong Rong, who was not present during the attack. Likewise, the 2021 suicide attack on a bus of Chinese engineers associated with the Dasu hydropower project was not claimed by any terrorist group. It bears mentioning that Pakistan blamed TTP for that bombing.

The latest attack has again targeted Chinese engineers working on the Dasu hydropower project. Last July, the Pakistani government decided to form a task force comprising personnel from the Pakistan Army, Punjab Rangers, Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts, police and levies force to ensure “foolproof” security of the project. Tuesday’s attack will bring the efficacy of the task force into sharp focus and could revive China’s past demand to allow private security companies to protect Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan.

Pakistan has refused to allow private Chinese security companies to operate in the country, particularly in conflict zones. Sources say the Pakistani authorities fear that allowing private Chinese security companies will not only reflect poorly on their leadership but also strengthen conspiracy theories about CPEC.

Furthermore, some in the West would see the arrival of private Chinese security companies as a precursor to the arrival of People’s Liberation Army troops in Pakistan.

The timing of the attack could not have been worse for Pakistan’s newly formed and fragile coalition government, struggling to revive from a downward economic spiral. It is banking on CPEC’s second phase which involves opening up special economic zones and cooperation in other sectors to revive the economy.

China and Saudi Arabia are two countries that a new Pakistani prime minister typically visits upon taking office. The most recent attack could change the focus of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s coming visit to Beijing from new economic projects to the efficacy of the current security measures for Chinese residents and projects.

The Baloch separatists view China as a neocolonial power which has furthered their sense of alienation and economic deprivation by colluding with the Pakistani state.

Children displaced by flash floods sleep as they take refuge in Balochistan province on September 2, 2022. Photo: AFP

The separatist groups take the view that projects like CPEC will reduce the Balochs to a minority in their own province. It bears mentioning that Balochistan, despite being mineral-rich and accounting for 44 per cent of Pakistan’s land area is the country’s least populated and developed province. It is also among the most impoverished.

To the separatists, CPEC and its development projects have worsened their socioeconomic grievances. Though touted as a game-changer by the Pakistani government, CPEC has yet to result in material benefits for Balochistan. Gwadar, where the deep-sea port is located, lacks infrastructure, clean drinking water and basic health facilities.

Gwadar’s electricity is imported from neighbouring Iran. Flash floods caused by torrential rains in February once again exposed Gwadar’s poor infrastructure. CPEC’s perception-reality gap in Balochistan has allowed the separatists to exploit local grievances to recruit, fundraise and propagandise.

With jihadist groups joining the fray and with Baloch separatist groups attacking Chinese people and property, Pakistan’s new government will find it hard to convince Beijing to kick-start new projects. Without addressing the genuine grievances of the Balochs and working with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to deal with the challenge posed by the TTP, the security situation is unlikely to improve.

Abdul Basit is a senior associate fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore