How independent Singapore’s ‘Chinese-ness’ helped shape China’s great revival
- Former Singapore foreign affairs minister George Yeo points to one particular element that has helped the city state build strong ties with China
- But it has also caused complexities in foreign policy for a multicultural, sovereign nation that has to ensure it isn’t seen as a Chinese state in Asean
The following is part one of an article first published in ThinkChina.sg by George Yeo, a former Singapore minister for foreign affairs, who is now senior adviser for Kuok Group and Kerry Logistics.
In 2018, China celebrated the 40th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s new policy of reform and opening up. In those 40 years, China’s economy grew roughly 50 times in US dollars, 200 times in renminbi terms and about 90 times in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Although the bulk of the effort was made by the Chinese people themselves, China was also helped by foreign assistance. Ten foreigners were awarded the China Reform Friendship Medal in 2018 for making a signal contribution to China’s astonishing transformation during this period.
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SINGAPORE’S ‘CHINESE-NESS’
In 1985, China’s State Council appointed Goh Keng Swee as an economic adviser on coastal development and tourism. Singapore was an inspiration to Deng. On his famous Southern Tour of 1992, Deng remarked that in social management, China should try to learn from and do better than Singapore. Like Dazhai for agriculture and Daqing for industry, Singapore quickly became a pilgrimage destination for reform and opening up.
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During the ‘90s, Singapore was an essential case study in China for economic development, social management and urban planning. Lee Kuan Yew directed that special courses be organised for Chinese officials in Singapore universities. Their alumni now number in the thousands, some among whom currently hold high positions. Not long after Deng’s famous remarks, Vice-Minister of Propaganda Xu Weicheng led a delegation on a 10-day study visit to Singapore, following which he wrote a short primer on this curious, predominantly Chinese city state. It became a classic of how China viewed Singapore at that time.
In 1995, Ding Guangen, a Politburo member responsible for all aspects of public communication and an old intimate of Deng Xiaoping, spent over a week in Singapore with a high-level ministerial delegation. As the minister for information and the arts, I was their host. They worked mornings, afternoons and evenings, taking no time off for shopping or sightseeing. Every aspect of public communications in Singapore was studied with care – bookshops, cinema halls, public libraries, museums, newspapers, radio, television, and the internet which was then in its infancy.
They called on Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and others. They quizzed me on the use of the internet and its effects on society. I replied that the internet could always be regulated, explaining how, as a matter of principle, we blocked a hundred sites (principally porn and hate sites) through internet providers. It was only some months later that I understood the purpose and the reason for the seriousness of Ding Guangen’s visit. It was to make final checks before China announced its national policy on the internet.
FAR-SIGHTED APPROACH
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I remember vividly the first meeting that China took part in. At an informal lunch in Bangkok, China’s Li Lanqing, Taiwan’s Vincent Siew, Hong Kong’s Brian Chau and myself spontaneously decided after collecting our food from the buffet line to sit together at the same table. I felt like a relative joining a family lunch. China’s membership of Apec (which necessitated careful agreement on the terms of Taiwan and Hong Kong’s inclusion) could not have come about without the leadership of US President George H.W. Bush.
THE TRADE GAME
Within our diplomatic capabilities, Singapore lobbied for China’s early accession to the WTO, which finally took place in Doha in November 2001. The negotiations were difficult for China, with the US, EU and Japan coordinating their demands. Feeling the pressure, China’s trade negotiators requested Singapore not to add to their burden. Since Singapore’s needs were more than adequately covered by the major powers, we agreed immediately.
In 2008, Singapore and China concluded an FTA that went beyond the Asean-China FTA. Around 2011, China indicated it would not stand in the way of a free-trade agreement we were negotiating with Taiwan while objecting to other countries doing the same. In 2013, Singapore and Taiwan signed an agreement, carefully named ASTEP (Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership). This was extraordinary and attested to the deep trust by China that Singapore’s relationship with Taiwan would help and not hinder eventual reunification. That trust enabled Singapore to provide the venue for Xi Jinping’s unprecedented meeting with Ma Ying-jeou as an equal. That equality extended to the equal sharing of the bill for dinner at the Shangri-La Hotel. Xi brought Guizhou Mao-tai while Ma brought Kinmen Kaoliang, both equally powerful spirits.
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Singapore could only play this unique role because of its Chinese-ness. Just before he became foreign minister (and without our foreknowledge of his coming promotion), I hosted Yang Jiechi as an MFA Distinguished Visitor to dinner in February 2007, where he spoke of the “mutual affection between our two peoples”. I was touched. It was a sentiment I shared but could not have expressed. Singapore’s Chinese-ness is part of our DNA, entangling Singapore with China in a way which causes complexities both domestically and in our foreign policy.
STRENGTH IN SOVEREIGNTY
Yet, it is not possible for others not to see us as majority cultural Chinese in our make-up. This is not a matter of presentation but of fact which we should wear naturally. When Francis became Pope in March 2013, he established a commission of eight Catholics to recommend reform of the Vatican’s administrative and financial system. For two years I did not know why I was asked to be a member. The appointment came as a surprise to me because I had not been active in my diocese. Only later did I find out that the Holy Father had asked for a Chinese Catholic to be included (all the others being European) and I was that Chinese. Someone told a Cardinal who was putting the commission together that I had left government and become available.
As a small country, Singapore is very reliant on multilateral institutions for its political and economic well-being. Singapore’s relationship with China was affected for a couple of years but has since recovered. At that time, many mainland Chinese were unhappy that “Chinese Singapore” did not take China’s side.
Singapore’s Chinese-ness is only one facet of what makes Singapore Singapore. There is an Indianness in us too. In 2010, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram invited me and my wife to his hometown in Chettinad for a holiday. As old friends, he wanted to acquaint me with his Chettiar heritage. During one conversation about the role Singapore played in India’s development, he casually remarked that many Indians considered Singapore to be a part of India. He meant it affectionately and I appreciated the sentiment.
Today, such a remark would be readily misunderstood. Notwithstanding, Singapore’s relations with India are of strategic importance to our long-term well-being. Yet another facet of Singapore is our reflection of Malaysia. In the speech I gave in Kuala Lumpur at the launch of my book in 2016, I described Malaysians and Singaporeans as “one people, two countries”. Tan Sri Dr Rais Yatim and Tan Sri Rafidah Aziz, both old friends and colleagues who honoured me by their presence, smiled. It is often difficult in a crowd of Malaysians and Singaporeans to distinguish between the two. This affinity naturally complicates bilateral relations, as it does too in our relations with China and India.