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SCMP Columnist
Zhou Xin
Zhou Xin
China’s ambitious urbanisation efforts draw to a close for most mainland provinces and cities
- The flow of domestic migrants is moving in the direction of the Greater Bay Area, the Yangtze River Delta and a handful of local economic hubs
- It shows how urbanisation in the great majority of Chinese cities and towns is probably over
Over the past few weeks, most local governments across China published residents’ data for 2023 that revealed new trends in domestic migrant flows.
As of Monday, 29 of the mainland’s 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions – except northeastern Heilongjiang province and Tibet – had reported such data, which showed a decline in population size at two-thirds of these local administrations.
While the National Bureau of Statistics already reported a 2.08 million decrease in the nation’s population last year, the residents’ data released by local government authorities indicated that the impact of such a decline was unevenly distributed.
The overall pace of urbanisation across the country also accelerated. The mainland’s urban population rose by 12 million last year, nearly double the 6.5 million increase recorded in 2022. Still, urbanisation in various local administrations appeared to have ceased.
03:23
China posts record-low birth rate despite government push for babies
China posts record-low birth rate despite government push for babies
When Beijing ended the country’s draconian zero-Covid-19 policy, many migrant workers returned to the major cities to seek jobs not available in rural areas
That resulted in the population of Shanghai, for example, growing by 115,600 last year after posting a 135,400 decrease in 2022. Beijing’s population recorded a modest 15,000 gain last year, which reversed six consecutive years of decline.
It showed how the so-called Matthew effect – in which prosperity grows in advanced urban centres, while poverty increases outside them – appears on the mainland. Migrant workers favour the country’s coastal cities and local economic hubs, where job prospects, wages and public services are better compared to those in economically disadvantaged smaller cities and towns that struggle with a shrinking and ageing local population.
Yet in spite of the return of migrant workers to big cities, China’s urban population has recorded a smaller annual increase compared to the 2009-2018 period when the major cities recorded at least 20 million new urban residents each year.
Some of these smaller Chinese cities are going the extra mile to become more relevant to young Chinese consumers.
Harbin, the provincial capital of Heilongjiang, mobilised resources to win back domestic and foreign tourists as a winter break destination. Tianshui, the second-largest city in northwestern Gansu province, has widely promoted its spicy hotpot in Chinese social media.
A second-tier industrial town in eastern Shandong province, Zibo has tried hard to sell itself as the nation’s “outdoor barbecue capital”.
Those marketing efforts, however, could not overcome the harsh reality of domestic migration. Shandong, for example, saw its population shrink by 400,000 last year because of outflows, the second-largest decrease among all mainland provinces, while Gansu saw 270,000 people leave the province in the same period.
Emptying villages or job-scarce cities: rural Chinese have tough row to hoe
Emptying villages or job-scarce cities: rural Chinese have tough row to hoe
The population of major coastal provinces, meanwhile, have risen primarily because of migrants. Eastern Zhejiang province, known for its vibrant private economy and e-commerce supply chains, saw its population grow by 500,000 in 2023.
Southern Guangdong province’s local residents, defined as those who have stayed there for more than six months, increased its population by 490,000 last year. The prospects for Guangdong’s population are particularly bright because it has one of the highest fertility rates in the country.
Local economic hubs have also been absorbing more people at the expense of neighbouring cities. Central Henan province, for example, recorded an overall population decrease of 570,000 in 2023, the steepest decline among all provinces. Yet its provincial capital of Zhengzhou, home to the world’s largest iPhone manufacturing facility, gained 180,000 new residents in the same period.
The population of southwestern Sichuan province fell by 60,000 in 2023, but its capital Chengdu reported 135,000 new local residents in the same period. It is not hard to imagine that the other cities across Henan and Sichuan also had to deal with an exodus of people.
The data shows the flow of domestic migrants is increasingly moving in the direction of the Greater Bay Area, the Yangtze River Delta and a handful of local economic hubs. This also means that urbanisation efforts in the great majority of Chinese cities and towns are probably over.
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