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China Politics

Taiwan issue, risk of conflict loom large for Beijing’s political elite

Democratic island expected to be front of mind at ‘two sessions’ meetings as mainland ramps up its pressure campaign
Rhetoric and military intimidation is set to continue, while across the strait public sentiment has further hardened against the Chinese government

Taiwan

Sarah Zhengin Beijing

Published: 6:00pm, 3 Mar 2021

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China’s political elite will gather in Beijing this week for the year’s biggest legislative set piece facing a number of major political challenges, including the aftermath of the coronavirus and the ongoing rivalry with the United States. In this latest article in a series looking at the key items on the agenda, we examine relations across the Taiwan Strait.

It is hard to imagine that just over five years ago, the leaders of China and Taiwan shared a dinner together in Singapore.

In November 2015, the highly choreographed affair at the Shangri-La Hotel saw China’s President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s then-president Ma Ying-jeou toasting over a lavish meal of sliced abalone, stir-fried lobster and spicy dan dan noodles. Xi told Ma that “no force can pull us apart because we are brothers who are still connected by our flesh, even if our bones are broken”.

But back in Taiwan, the intimate message angered hundreds of protesters, who branded Ma a “traitor”. Two months after the historic and controversial summit, Tsai Ing-wen easily defeated Ma’s party in the presidential election, amid growing fears of Beijing’s influence over the democratic island.

There has been no official dialogue between the leaders across the Taiwan Strait since, as Beijing has insisted that talks cannot happen until the Tsai administration accepts the “1992 consensus”, or a political understanding that there is only one China with different interpretations on both sides as to what constitutes “China”. Beijing has vowed to bring Taiwan under its rule, by force if necessary, after Chiang Kai-shek’s defeated Nationalist force fled to the island following the Chinese civil war in 1949.

Then-Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of their historic summit in Singapore in 2015. Photo: AFP

While the question of Taiwan is not on the official agenda for Beijing’s annual “two sessions” legislative meetings, it will be front of mind for many delegates at the conclave, just months ahead of the symbolically important 100th anniversary of the ruling Communist Party.

Xi, who changed constitutional term limits in 2018 to allow himself to remain in power beyond 2023, has said that the “reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland is key to his goal of “national rejuvenation”.

Five things you need to know about China’s biggest political gatherings

Observers say that the two sessions will discuss the growing risk of conflict over Taiwan, with Beijing ramping up its hawkish rhetoric and pressure campaign against the island as Tsai’s government deepens ties with the US, whose relations with China have sunk to the lowest level in decades. While official cross-strait dialogue is off the table, Beijing will keep up its pressure on Taiwan, coupled with grey-zone warfare tactics to wear down the island’s military defences, analysts say.

“The two sessions are more on the political side, and will balance the signals from the military side,” said Lin Ying-yu, from the Institute of Strategic and International Affairs at National Chung Cheng University in Taiwan. “China has divided these very clearly – the military side on Taiwan will more actively carry out exercises and engage in stronger rhetoric. But on the political side, they will signal they are willing to have exchanges with Taiwan, with a clear distinction made between ‘Taiwanese independence’ forces and cross-strait exchanges.”

10:22

Why has the relationship between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan taken a turn for the worse?

Ahead of the two sessions – which will approve new laws and set out China’s political priorities for the year – Wang Yang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the top leadership body, said in January that Beijing would take four measures to ease cross-strait tensions. These included allowing Taiwanese business leaders to take part in key economic projects, supporting Fujian – the province across the strait from Taiwan – in efforts to develop cross-strait integration, introducing more policies to encourage Taiwanese to live and work in the mainland, and breaking down barriers to political integration. Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office has also announced four new “cross-strait exchange bases” in the mainland to promote cultural and economic exchanges with Taiwan.

But at the same time, in the first few weeks of 2021 alone, Chinese aircraft entered the southwestern section of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone more than 30 times in its intensifying military pressure campaign.

The risks of a conflict are growing, but I believe are not high. Domestic factors in China are driving China to adopt a tougher stance

Bonnie Glaser, China Power Project

China’s defence ministry also issued a stark warning to new US President Joe Biden – whose administration said it had a “rock-solid” commitment to supporting Taiwan – that “Taiwanese independence means war”. The possibility of US military intervention on behalf of Taiwan has long served as a deterrence against a Chinese invasion scenario.

Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said Wang’s remarks suggested “China has not abandoned using economic carrots, but the role of sticks in its toolbox is much greater, and growing”.

“I’m less concerned about the rhetoric than I am about actions,” she said, citing a simulated attack in late January by Chinese fighters and bombers against a US carrier. “The risks of a conflict are growing, but I believe are not high. Domestic factors in China are driving China to adopt a tougher stance.”

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has offered to hold dialogue with Beijing “under the principles of parity and dignity”. Photo: AFP

In Taiwan, public sentiment has further hardened against Beijing. Tsai, from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party, won re-election in January last year in a landslide, an apparent endorsement of her administration’s tougher stance against China. She has offered to hold dialogue with Beijing “under the principles of parity and dignity”, but Beijing has insisted that a prerequisite for talks is the acceptance of the “1992 consensus”.

However, a survey by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in November found 74 per cent of the public rejected Beijing’s position on the “1992 consensus”, and more than 90 per cent opposed the Communist Party’s use of force to threaten Taiwan. Even the mainland-friendly opposition Kuomintang has held internal discussions on whether to continue supporting the “1992 consensus”.

If Taiwan continues to be so hostile … then it will be harder for Taiwanese scholars or individuals to come to the mainland

Li Zhengguang, Beijing Union University

The souring of Taiwanese public opinion on Beijing comes despite a host of policies with incentives to lure Taiwanese people and businesses to the mainland. And even as mainland China has tried to engage in “cognitive warfare” in Taiwan to sway sentiment in Beijing’s favour, the effects have been limited against strong anti-Beijing sentiments, according to Taiwanese think tank the Institute for National Defence and Security Research.

In recent months, space for cross-strait exchanges has also been constrained by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as by concerns over risks after the Chinese government’s high-profile campaign against Taiwanese “spies” last year.

“It is true that right now, cross-strait exchanges are in a very difficult stage because of the pandemic,” Li Zhengguang, deputy director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, said. “And if Taiwan continues to be so hostile towards the mainland, then it will be harder for Taiwanese scholars or individuals to come to the mainland. If they are willing to ease tensions, on the mainland side, the door is wide open.”

China 1949: why did the Communists win?

Another factor is how much the Biden administration’s policy towards Taiwan will shift from his predecessor Donald Trump’s more chaotic and hawkish approach, which further elevated US support for Taiwan with arms sales and high-level exchanges. Analysts say that since Biden has been in office for only a few weeks, adjustments in policies for the Taiwan issue from the various sides may not take place until the second half of the year.

Li said there was a temporary end to the fierce confrontation between China and the US after Trump left the White House, but the Biden government was expected to continue its support for Taiwan.

“I think the frequency and the force with which the US plays the Taiwan card will decrease, but this does not impact the US’ political support to Taiwan’s authorities, and the moral support for Taiwan’s military,” he said. “If it is just rhetoric, economic, military or political support, it will not cause intense turmoil in the Taiwan Strait.”

While Li cited Politburo Standing Committee member Wang’s remarks in January that “time and power” were on Beijing’s side, hawkish rhetoric from the mainland has heightened concerns that China would be more willing to take military action against Taiwan. During last year’s two sessions, Premier Li Keqiang’s annual work report left off the word “peaceful” when referring to the need for “reunification” of Taiwan and the mainland, although Beijing has insisted that “peaceful reunification” remains its policy towards the island.

Hu Xijin, the high-profile editor of nationalistic state-run tabloid Global Times, warned in early February that People’s Liberation Army fighter jets would fly to Taiwan and declare sovereignty over the island if there was a sudden elevation in official ties between the US and Taipei.

“Peaceful reunification is not carried out solely through mild negotiations and by admonishments with well-meaning words,” he wrote on Weibo. “If the island’s political forces not only reject peaceful reunification but overtly and secretly promote Taiwanese independence, then the mainland side will use greater and greater military pressure – a necessary part of ‘peaceful reunification’.”

02:17

‘One China’ explained

This sentiment was echoed by Beijing-based pundit Sima Nan, whose real name is Yu Li, who in January posted on his Weibo social media account about a “cold” version of “forced reunification”, or essentially “putting a gun to their head” to force “peaceful reunification”. The assessment was that negotiating with Taiwan for unification would be futile and an actual invasion would be too costly, he said.

Lin, from National Chung Cheng University, questioned whether the “reunification” of Taiwan would be a top priority for Beijing in the near term, given the challenges in US-China relations, the pandemic, Hong Kong and even the military coup in neighbouring Myanmar. He said voices from the “forced reunification” faction in the mainland would not decrease, but there were still others calling for “peaceful reunification”, and options to use military means to create space for “peaceful reunification”.

“As for Taiwan’s cross-strait policy, it all depends on the direction of the relations across the Taiwan Strait,” he said. “If the mainland continues its military exercises and tougher attitudes, then Taiwan will adopt this defensive mentality, and naturally this will elevate the unfriendly stance on both sides.”

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