But the report claims that after 20 years, terrorist attacks on the US mainland have been significantly controlled and prevented. The risk from rogue states, with the US missile defence system, will also not be that imminent.

Therefore, the geopolitical challenges should now return to the centrepiece. Between China and Russia, Russia is a regional power and China is a global power. So therefore, China is the most formidable challenge or even an enemy. That’s the policy change.

After that, despite the transition from [Donald] Trump to [Joe] Biden, you see the continuity very much in line with these two reports.

Now, the San Francisco meeting is not supposed to reverse the US policy towards China. This is only to provide a floor preventing a further downward spiral, but we’re not changing back to the previous period. I think it will take a long time for a return to the really normal relationship 10 years ago. It will probably take 10-15 years to achieve that.

You were in the US when ties started deteriorating. How does it feel watching US-China relations take a bad turn in the past few years? From your engagements in the US, how starkly have domestic sentiments towards China shifted?

I have argued for years that the deterioration of US-China relations is only partially related to their leaders. Or it’s a very small portion. Mainly it’s a structural problem.

What I mean by the structural problem refers to three things. One, the US has never, since the end of World War II, confronted a rivalry so comprehensive and all-rounded like China. China’s challenge includes its economic, military, science and technology, and now you see – [the] ambassador said – also ideological or even political power. Some people in the US even talk about culture challenge. While I disagree with the view of a cultural or an ideological challenge, it’s comprehensive.

Now, the second reason is US domestic reasons. If the United States is in a good shape – if the American political system, the economy, society, political culture and many other things are in a good shape – then we don’t care about China’s different political system, different ideology, different economic model.

But what happened in the US in terms of vicious divides makes China’s different economic model, different political system, different ideology even more exaggerated and more sensitive. That also will not disappear quickly.

Thirdly, more substantially, is the rise of the Chinese middle class over the past three decades, from non-existent to becoming the largest middle-class country. The American middle class has shrunk from 70 per cent after World War II to now about 50 per cent, so that’s actually created another dimension of structural problem.

Not necessarily that Americans see that the Chinese middle class is eating up their lunch, but the American middle class, or particularly low-middle class, did not benefit from economic globalisation. So they see that China’s advance is at the US’ expense and that explains why Biden’s promising to lift tariffs never worked because America’s working class does not support that policy.

Well, I don’t think the US itself is prepared. The whole world will be significantly impacted and the Chinese are no exception. No one’s well-prepared because information is not complete.

We do not know, if he wins, what kind of margin, whether the other party would dispute the result, and whether many American elites would think Donald Trump is a dictator.

Of course, China’s Taiwan is also very worried about how Donald Trump’s [policy of] isolationism would go. But Trump’s Republican base is probably more conservative, more ideological in certain aspects, and more anti-China. And also, in general, some Republican politicians – not necessarily Donald Trump – want to pursue regime change in China.

And so, that is a different scale because the Biden administration never said regime change. In a way Trump’s isolationism can unfold in China’s favour for obvious reasons. But on the other hand, the conservative base, the anti-China base, is much stronger in the Republican Party than the Democratic Party, which also makes China very worried.

At the end of the day, it all depends not only on how Donald Trump’s second term is different from his first term but it also depends on what team he will use. Whether he will use Michael Pompeo, Peter Navarro, Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller – these people are famous for their very anti-China approach. Or he will go to a less critical or more engaging team.

I want to ask about the external challenges that US-China ties are facing. Tensions in the region have remained particularly high over issues involving the South China Sea, Taiwan and Korean peninsula. How would you weigh these issues, and in your view, which is the most dangerous flashpoint in the region right now?

When we review the history, for 40 years, the Asia-Pacific actually maintained precious peace. Before that, World War II happened in the Asia-Pacific and there was the Korean war and the Vietnam war. Some of the most devastating wars took place in the region.

Looking back, if the world enters another war, this will be even more devastating because this is an area that, particularly in the event of a US and China conflict, will involve modern technology and AI use.

Where is the dangerous spot? I personally think that China will not use force over Taiwan. China maintained some restraint over Taiwan’s election. And so, probably I think it will be more possible for an incident in the South China Sea to happen.

But again, there are a lot of uncertainties, whether Democrats can win the next election or if Donald Trump wins, he probably would try again with the North Korean leader. So there’s a lot of uncertainty in this region.

Both the US and China have accused each other of raising tensions in the region. In your view, who is the one fuelling tensions?

Mutually reinforced fear and animosity is what I call it. China’s view is that it wants to maintain the status quo but the US wants to push the envelope and support Taiwan to cross the red line. In recent years, the US policy has already crossed the red line many times with high-level meetings, some even want to send troops to Taiwan. Some US politicians say that we should support Taiwan independence.

All these things make China think that the US side is the reason for the tensions or escalation. But of course, Western countries blame China for military mobilisation and tremendous pressures on Taiwan. So again, I will say that it’s a mutually reinforced fear and animosity.

Talking about Taiwan, its January election was one that was very closely watched by the world. How do you think Beijing has approached the result, given that the government has repeatedly warned against voting for the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party]?

Beijing has some leverage over Taipei and they can use a lot of pressure, non-military means, but thus far they haven’t used that much. So that shows Beijing wants to have some patience to see how things unfold.

We can see that the DPP re-election changes the previous 8-8-8 pattern [where no party has ever won three straight terms] of the rotation of power. But in Beijing’s favour, the DPP’s support was reduced from 57 per cent to 40 per cent and DPP also lost the majority in the legislature.

04:31

Vice-President William Lai wins Taiwan presidential election as his party loses legislature majority

Vice-President William Lai wins Taiwan presidential election as his party loses legislature majority

Particularly, there’s one report by some US think tank that said if the Taiwanese can fight for 90 days then we – meaning the US and Taiwan – will win. But how could it be possible? People just think that’s crazy. Because the global market will immediately change. Taiwanese say they are probably not able to fight for nine hours, certainly not 90 days. So that has actually alienated a lot of Taiwanese people.

Taiwanese young people do not have a China identity. They don’t like to be unified with the mainland. But also they don’t want to die in war. So that changed the dynamics, and the young people partly are not ideological and many support [former presidential hopefuls] Ko Wen-je and Terry Gou.

China hopes that these young people will continue to see what will happen in the US election, what will happen in China. And in that regard, Hong Kong is important. If Hong Kong remains tightly controlled, it will probably have no way to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese young people.

Unless Hong Kong becomes more open, enjoys more autonomy and freedom. Then China probably will have more leverage over Taiwan. Of course, this will take some time.

You suggested that Beijing is approaching the results with some patience and restraint in hopes of some sort of mindset change among Taiwan’s youth. Will China’s patience run out at some point? How long do you think China will be willing to wait?

Certainly the previous narrative that China will use force now, after the election or 2024, was flawed. Chinese leaders repeatedly said China does not have a time plan or timetable. I think the whole argument that China will attack Taiwan militarily is exaggerated.

I want to move on from Taiwan to China’s role in the world, especially with conflicts raging in the Middle East and Europe. How successful do you think China has been in showing that it can be a leader in these situations? Can China play maybe a greater role in global conflicts?

He was one of very few people who spoke alone and not as a panellist. [US Secretary of State Antony] Blinken was a panellist.

Those who had a one-person programme were only the UN secretary general, the German chancellor, President of Ukraine [Volodymyr] Zelensky. I think that’s all, plus Wang Yi. So you can get [a sense of] the huge respect.

Whether China is a respected force, it depends on whom you ask. If you ask European countries or the US, they are going to be very cynical. If you ask countries in the Global South, they will think that China plays a really important role. To a certain extent, even Ukraine hopes that China will play a positive role. That tells you a lot.

So certainly, China has emphasised multilateralism, emphasised that China is not going to replace the existing international system, and it only wants to improve the international system. China will comply with the UN resolution. China hopes that the solution for the conflict will be peacefully resolved rather than endless military conflict. China is willing to play a mediating role. That’s the things that Wang Yi said recently.

In the recent Munich Security Conference, the theme was “Lose-Lose”. It’s very much in line with China’s argument that if you take a zero-sum game view to look at today’s world, it will be a lose-lose [result]. All these things show that China’s narrative sounds like it resonates well with the majority of people in today’s world.

Last year, there was much global attention paid to the departure of Qin Gang and Li Shangfu as [foreign and defence] ministers. Given your expertise in Chinese politics, I have to ask, what do these developments say about President Xi’s leadership?

Secondly, [when] Xi Jinping fired them, it was all of a sudden. He actually made an initiative move to fire them. That’s another thing – sounds like he was quite decisive.

Also very interesting was that both Li Shangfu and Qin Gang were qualified for these positions in a way, in their experience or [professional skills]. Not talking about the possible problems – either women issues or corruption issues – that’s a different matter. But talking about their previous working experience. One was in the aerospace industry for decades. The other, Qin Gang, when he was appointed to the position there was some talk about his helicopter rise.

01:54

China sacks defence minister Li Shangfu with no explanation after nearly two-month absence

China sacks defence minister Li Shangfu with no explanation after nearly two-month absence

But when Qin Gang was removed, two things were interesting. One was that the person who replaced him is not a new foreign minister but an older one who returned, which means that they could not find [someone] appropriate. Those critics of Xi now talk about how Qin Gang was very capable. So that’s really proof that Xi Jinping’s appointment of him, it’s not purely on [personal] ties because he was a capable leader … despite some problems.

In that regard, [the dismissal of Qin and Li] did not hurt Xi Jinping too much. Of course, it does not look good in many ways and he would rather not have these things happen but he decisively removed these leaders and thus reduced [any] damage.

Well, from the language of Qin Gang’s resignation – asked to resign – it’s a clear indication that it’s not a criminal thing [that led to his removal] or not severe enough to think he was fired. That’s my interpretation.

I think that we will eventually know, probably in the third plenary session what will happen to these two leaders.

I wanted to end off on this interview by asking about Hong Kong, where you are based now. Some have argued that it’s over for Hong Kong. Do you think so now that you have moved there? Is there a special role you envision the city playing amid great power rivalry?

Number two, despite the recent economic and financial problems, Hong Kong is still one of biggest financial centres in Asia, and arguably the biggest. It’s particularly noticeable that Beijing no longer talks about Shenzhen or Shanghai replacing Hong Kong as a financial centre. Several years ago they talked about that but not any more. Chinese leaders put a lot of hope on Hong Kong’s financial development.

I think the US is making a mistake to consider Hong Kong is nothing but a PRC city because Hong Kong has so many foreign financial institutions. Currently, the stock market is low and this is a great opportunity to invest. So the financial centre will not be gone. It will rebound. It’s a matter of time.

Number three, Hong Kong universities are very strong, according to a recent British survey. Among the top 100 universities in the world, Hong Kong has five seats. [HKU] is ranked number one in Hong Kong. Hong Kong as a city has the largest number [of top universities]; Boston may be second with only four. I’ve worked at HKU for eight months, I do think that the universities maintain a high quality of education with a cosmopolitan student body and faculty body. No one’s telling me what you can teach or what you cannot teach. That’s happening at a time when mainland universities experience a lot of restrictions. Of course, Hong Kong has its own tensions and problems, but the above three are important.

With all these three things, you think Hong Kong is dead? Beijing leaders actually often make a point that Hong Kong is not just a regular Chinese city. If Hong Kong becomes like Shenzhen or Shanghai, it’s a failure. That’s not what I said, but what the representative of Beijing’s office in Hong Kong recently said.