“In the coming period, both countries will be more focused on advancing reforms to address their own domestic imperatives and improve national competitiveness than on seeking to compel the other to alter their economic model,” he said.

“For the United States, President [Joe] Biden has identified four crises that demand immediate action: controlling Covid-19, reviving the American economy, contending with climate change, and addressing racial and social justice issues. For China, President Xi has identified pressing challenges relating to corruption, pollution, and poverty alleviation. The Chinese leadership also will be focused on shifting its economic model to dual circulation.”

In a communique issued after a plenary session of the Communist Party’s Central Committee late last year, party leaders said the dual circulation model would be implemented by policies aiming to expand domestic demand with supply-side reforms.

The model, which is expected to be elaborated during the “two sessions”, needs to be understood in relation to the foreign policy challenges faced by China, according to Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China in Beijing.

“China’s foreign policies are facing all sorts of difficulties. It is especially challenging in the development of high technology, a field where fierce competition is ongoing. China’s high-end investment overseas is shrinking significantly, this is also a major difficulty … the main essence of dual circulation is [therefore] a focus on development of self-reliant high-end technology,” he said.

China expert Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor at Cornell University in New York, said that while dual circulation was an example of how crucial it was to understand a seemingly domestic strategy from Beijing’s international position, there were also internal policies that could become part of its foreign policy in the future.

Blinken says China poses 21st century’s greatest geopolitical challenge

Another example, according to Weiss, was Xi’s September pledge that China – the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter – would achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and be a constructive player in addressing climate change.

“Climate [change] is ultimately an issue that China sees as starting from its domestic interest. Not only [is it important for China] having clean air to breathe, but also [to achieve a] commanding position in the next generation of renewable energy in the marketplace,” she said.

“Pretty much everything China does has an international dimension these days. It is not just the domestic [policymaking] that affects the international, but the international affects domestic.”

While observers will be watching Wang’s press conference closely for signs of shifts in Beijing’s foreign policy positions, one priority for 2021 has already been set. In an interview with China’s state media earlier this year, Wang stressed that China would be supporting the global recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.

He made it clear that China has positioned itself as a provider of vaccines to developing countries – a stance reiterated on Wednesday by Guo Weimin, spokesman for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). China has already announced a plan to provide 10 million Covid-19 vaccine doses to developing nations, with shipments under way to friendly countries.

But Pang Zhongying, a professor of international affairs at the Ocean University of China in Qingdao, has doubts about how far Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy will extend its influence among politically sceptical countries, especially in light of the keen competition between the vaccine-producing nations.

“The extent of how far Chinese vaccines are able to reach is actually going to be very telling of China’s influence in the world in a post-pandemic era,” he said. One solution, he suggested, could be to repurpose the belt and road strategy from infrastructure to health.

The belt and road plan has been expanding Chinese influence around the world since 2013, through investment and infrastructure development. It was hit hard by the pandemic. The foreign ministry said in June last year that about 20 per cent of all projects had been “seriously affected”, 40 per cent “adversely affected” and 30-40 per cent “somewhat affected” by the global health crisis.

Pang said he expected Beijing’s change of focus, to more domestic driven economic growth, to have implications for the future of the belt and road plan.

“The Belt and Road Initiative, which has been focused on infrastructure building and financial investment, could be slowly changed to be more health-focused, in response to the current need for vaccines in the pandemic, which China can provide,” he said. “At the same time, this would be in line with the changing priorities that China may have under dual circulation.”

Shi, at Renmin University, also said the Chinese government should be reviewing the belt and road plan, which has been mentioned in the government work report at the two sessions every year since it was introduced.

“In the upcoming work report, I think the [government’s] stance on the Belt and Road Initiative will be very general and a continuation of its previous stance, like saying China will support its development,” he said.

“The initiative has had many complications after the pandemic hit and has been shrinking. I think the government is still assessing and trying to make adjustments [to it]. But of course, these will not be in the report.”

Additional reporting by Jun Mai