But what kind of diplomacy should the two employ when both parties are not on speaking terms, and who should take the first step when both sides are denying the “ball is in their court”?

As a starting point, experts point to Japan, South Korea and Asean countries as models of best practice in diplomacy with China.

Japan’s success in dealing with China lies with its ethos to not lose sight of the fact that China is an important trading partner, and by not engaging in firm criticism of China, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo Kawashima Shin said in an essay for the Nippon Communications Foundation after new Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga took office in September.

“Tokyo has been hesitant to join the West in condemning China’s human-rights abuses, including the anti-democracy crackdown in Hong Kong, and its position on Taiwan is unclear as well,” he said.

Last month, a Japanese diplomatic source told the South China Morning Post that the new Suga administration was still endorsing that strategy by making a decision to tread the thin line between China and the United States “carefully”.

“China is a key trading partner, a big market for Japanese products and a strong neighbouring military presence,” the diplomatic source said. “The US is our traditional security ally and economic partner. Japan needs to be firm on its stand but also be mindful of its relationship with both, as one step closer to one might be interpreted as a step away from the other.”

Later, in his trip to Southeast Asia, Suga reiterated Japan’s position of “strongly opposing any actions that escalate tensions in the South China Sea” without directly referring to China, the source added.

Japan’s ability to walk the China tightrope – despite the two having a troubled wartime history – should be a diplomatic blueprint for Australia, which has in recent times acted contrary to that strategy, former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans has said.

“The question in these issues is not whether to stand up, but how to stand up. And the reality is that the way in which we [Australia] have responded to, for the most part legitimate, concerns over the last few years has made us extremely vulnerable – much more so than other countries in the region, like Japan, who have been walking a similar tightrope,” Evans said in an opinion piece in the public policy journal Pearls and Irritations last week.

While there are multiple legitimate concerns about Beijing’s behaviour which require a firm and clear response, Australia had done so with tone-deaf and “over the top” actions, he said.

That approach compounded with years of other unresolved conflicts, such as the banning of Huawei’s 5G technology and media allegations of widespread spying by Chinese-Australians, bringing matters to a head, according to Melissa Conley Tyler, a research fellow with the Asia Institute Research at the University of Melbourne.

“In Australia’s case, we now know it’s not directed towards one policy, [but] more the sense that Australia has been acting in an unfriendly manner across a number of areas – and this has consequences,” she said.

“In some of these, it wasn’t so much Australia’s decision as [it was] the way it was communicated that created friction, such as announcing foreign interference legislation as ‘standing up to China’. This has created a perception that Australia is unfriendly.”

For Australia’s part, Evans recommended a five-step remedy – with the first step being to stop “digging” a deeper hole.

“Don’t add any more grounds for complaint to the 14 [grievances] that have been conveniently listed for us recently by the Chinese embassy’s resident wolf warriors,” he said, expanding on the first step. “While I would regard most of these complaints as overdrawn, only three of them seem to me completely without justification.”

Secondly, the official language used against China needs to be toned down, he said, as the choice of words is critical in diplomacy and can be damaging. Thirdly, the “legion of over-excitable foreign influence enthusiasts in the government’s ranks”, as well as local media, should take note that Australian leaders need to make “absolutely clear” that the decisions they make are independent.

“Fourth, we need to acknowledge the legitimacy and inevitability of some of China’s international aspirations, and not get overexcited about it wanting to buy strategic space for itself,” he said. “Much of its recent behaviour is no more than could be expected of a dramatically, economically rising, hugely trade-dependent, regional superpower wanting to flap its wings and reassert its historical greatness after more than a century of wounded pride, and should not be assumed to be a precursor to military aggression.”

Finally, he said both countries should find projects on which they share common ground. Even though Beijing has been aggressive in its approach, it has been cooperative in areas such as climate change, peacekeeping, counterterrorism and even its response to the pandemic, more than it has been given credit for, Evans said.

Conley Tyler also suggested steps to quickly cool tensions, starting with Australia signing up to the Belt and Road Initiative, as Japan did.

“First, it’s entirely symbolic and doesn’t bind Australia to do anything,” she said. “Australia can participate in individual projects or not as it chooses. Second, there’s no material cost to Australia, nor any need to alter substantive policies. Yet, it would be read as a significant gesture by China.”

In the same vein, Australia should drop a bill that would give the Australian foreign affairs minister the power to cancel international agreements entered into by state governments, local councils and universities, Conley Tyler argued. The bill had its genesis in the Australian government’s disapproval of the state of Victoria’s non-binding agreement on the Belt and Road Initiative.

It should also drop the amendments to foreign investment rules, also seen to be aimed at China, she said, adding that neither would bode well for Australia’s overall international image.

Former trade minister Andrew Robb, who presided over the signing of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, suggested that Australia invite China to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – an 11-nation free-trade deal between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam – that China has its eye on.

“We need to work off things we do well together in the commercial area; there is a whole raft of things we can propose to Beijing, for example, to improve the multilateral bodies [such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund] ,” Robb said during a livestock industry webinar two weeks ago. “We can propose setting up a bilateral working group. These are things in a space where we don’t have conflict or rivalry, and they are good things to do.”

South Korea, for one, has shown that conflicts with China can be resolved on “neutral grounds” at multilateral meetings.

The meeting was preceded by a South Korean promise to a “three no’s” position in parliament that comprised “no additional THAAD deployment, no agreement to join a US anti-missile system, and no trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan”, Lee said.

“Australia and South Korea are in a similar situation,” he said. “If you cannot solve the problem, you should instead ‘manage’ the problem so that it won’t get out of hand and it won’t become the biggest issue that hurts bilateral ties.”

While these strategies seemed one-sided, they fit best with China’s demands for its trading partners to avoid taking sides and meddling in its domestic affairs, according to some analysts in mainland China.

“China wants Australia not to take sides between China and the US, because it thinks that Australia depends on China economically and has sufficient self-interest not to [take sides],” said Andy Xie, an independent Shanghai economist. “China will cut everything off [in trade] when it finds alternatives.”

Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Centre at East China Normal University in Shanghai, also noted how the world’s second-largest economy bristles at any country trying to challenge its sovereignty.

“To live and let live – this is what China wants as the principle for international relations in today’s world that is being threatened by ideological extremism,” Chen said. “China has never exercised coercion on Australia with political or other demands. It is wide of the mark to assume that China is using economic leverage to make [those] demands from Australia.

“As both countries need to strive for mutual trust instead of wariness, Canberra needs to be aware that ideologisation is out of date. A more proactive and conducive approach needs to be explored and adopted.”