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Illustration: Stephen Case
Opinion
Brian Y. S. Wong and Tidarat Yingcharoen
Brian Y. S. Wong and Tidarat Yingcharoen

How Thailand can draw closer to China despite US rivalry and geopolitical tensions

  • The Thai military should focus on regional peacekeeping with China, especially in Myanmar, while Thailand must remain a safe haven for investment
  • Bangkok should also promote people-to-people connections, including in tourism, and keep the local media free from foreign interference

July 1 marked the 48th anniversary of the formalisation of Sino-Thai relations. Today, China is Thailand’s largest trading partner with US$135 billion of trade last year, about 18 per cent of Thailand’s total.

Thai exports to China have also jumped, from just US$1.82 billion in 1995 to US$37.7 billion in 2021, a testament to China’s burgeoning middle class and Thailand’s growing competitiveness as a manufacturing and agricultural powerhouse.

With their cultural and interpersonal ties, a clear preference among Chinese households for holidaying in Thailand and joint venture successes from healthcare to cutting-edge start-ups and innovation, both countries have long enjoyed a synergy from the pooling of their capital, talent and knowledge.
The Belt and Road Initiative has yielded considerable success in advancing regional infrastructural development through Thailand – an effective Southeast Asian heartland connecting China with Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Malaysia via a sophisticated train and logistical network.

While receiving a Chinese delegation earlier this year, Pheu Thai Party leader Chonlanan Srikaew pledged to “drive more trade agreements, promote investment, mutual import-export, tourism as well as the exchange of technology”.

Yet for Sino-Thai ties to meaningfully deepen, broaden and weather the coming decades, Beijing and Bangkok must address the elephant in the room: incipient geopolitical tensions largely stemming from the Sino-US rivalry.

First, Thailand has sought to deepen military coordination with China while maintaining its deep military and defence ties with the US as a major non-Nato ally. This approach coheres with Thailand’s “bamboo diplomacy”, an outlook that favours careful balancing between great powers and a staunch defence of national interests.
Planes take part in the Falcon Strike joint air combat exercise between China and Thailand, which began in July, and is held to “strengthen military cooperation between the two countries and maintain regional peace and stability”, according to Xinhua. Photo: Weibo

Yet, as Washington increasingly applies pressure on Southeast Asian nations to pick sides in what it construes as a shoring-up of its regional influence against potential challenges from China, Thailand may be forced to choose.

The recent and ongoing series of joint military exercises reflect the shared intentions of Beijing and Bangkok to neutralise regional conflicts and tensions, yet they are taking place against a background of renewed American interest in courting Southeast Asia.
For Sino-Thai military cooperation to continue, a clear delineation of the remit and limits of the Thai military’s relationship with both its US and Chinese counterparts is needed. More constructively, the incoming Thai cabinet should capitalise on the country’s historical ties with both Beijing and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, to seek a Sino-Asean-brokered peace deal to restore a modicum of democracy to Myanmar.

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Myanmar junta pardons ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, ex-president Win Myint after postponing polls

Myanmar junta pardons ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, ex-president Win Myint after postponing polls

Second, Thailand should position itself as a safe haven for investment amid the increasing Balkanisation of the global financial and supply chains. The war in Ukraine has kick-started a cascade of reorientations by multinational corporations and assets, with many moving from China to Southeast Asia in search of greater policy certainty.

Small and medium-sized enterprises in Northeast Asia concerned by the potential fallout from military tensions in the Taiwan Strait have been eyeing Thailand as a cheaper, more regionally connected production base. Such divestment incentives also apply to Chinese companies looking for fertile ground for growth, both domestically and abroad.

Thailand is no stranger to Chinese state-owned enterprises, such as SAIC Motor, which has teamed up with Charoean Pokphand Group to leverage Thailand as a hub of product internationalisation.

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China-Laos railway boosts Chinese imports of Thai durian

China-Laos railway boosts Chinese imports of Thai durian
Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor also provides a prime opening for the diversification efforts of companies abroad. Similarly, Thai manufacturers must invest in developing greater resilience and self-sufficiency in the face of potential flare-ups that could disrupt the supply of critical minerals and other raw materials.
Key policymakers in Thailand can tap the country’s vast rare earth resources. Beijing should in turn ensure its joint ventures in Thailand remain sanction-proof and robust amid the precipitous weaponisation of finance in global geopolitics.
Finally, at the core of any healthy bilateral relationship lie genuine and grounded people-to-people exchanges. Thailand was among the first countries that China resumed post-Covid group tours to, with Anutin Charnvirakul, the deputy prime minister and public health minister, greeting Chinese visitors at Suvarnahumi Airport in January.

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Chinese buyers flock to Thailand’s property market in search of security following pandemic

Chinese buyers flock to Thailand’s property market in search of security following pandemic

While Thai businesses have largely profited from the astronomical rise in China’s purchasing power and Chinese markets over the past few decades, some argue that such dividends have not trickled down to the lower-middle and working classes.

China’s “zero-dollar” tourists had a lukewarm local response owing to the tour groups’ concentrated spending, which mostly goes back to Chinese operators. The multiplier effect is clearly not working.

Tensions between the Thai population and Chinese visitors could well arise due to many factors, including economically rooted resentment, but also stereotypes, religious disagreements or an increasingly politicised media space where portrayals of China’s rise are often swayed by vested interests.

Chinese tourists in Thailand face jail for stepping on coral, touching starfish

The Thai government must strive to ensure its media outlets remain free from foreign interference and that coverage of its relationships with the US and China alike remains balanced, candid and fact-oriented. Beijing, on the other hand, must think prudently and critically about how China can gain even more trust, and win Thai hearts and minds.

Hong Kong certainly has a role to play. With Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu making Thailand the destination for his first overseas trip last year, the city’s special connections are clearly set to become increasingly important, as an additional conduit to China’s relationship with Thailand.

A win-win partnership awaits both China and Thailand, but key hurdles must first be overcome.

Brian Wong is an assistant professor in philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, and a Rhodes Scholar and adviser on strategy for the Oxford Global Society

Tidarat Yingcharoen is a Thai-Myanmar academic, educator and politician who is currently the spokesperson and director of the policy centre for the Thai Sang Thai Party in Thailand

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