As South China Sea risks rise, rival claimants have a way out – compromise
While China is doubling down on its claims to much of the South China Sea, rival claimants are enhancing their military capabilities and collaborating with the US
China, its rival claimants and the US can and must compromise – the alternative is to see China’s absolute hegemony or a universally catastrophic conflict
China’s position, policy and practices in the South China Sea have become counterproductive to its attempts to enhance its soft power and relations with Southeast Asia. Still, it continues them and has even doubled down on its historical claim to much of the sea – a claim rejected by a Permanent Court of Arbitration panel in 2016 – by enforcing it with its maritime militia, coastguard and even, occasionally, its navy.
China’s rival claimants – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – are pushing back with steps such as enhanced military presence and upgrades, or collaborating with the United States and other outside powers. This increasing militarisation of the South China Sea disputes sets the stage for the worst-case scenario – frequent and widespread conflict that eventually results in a military confrontation between China and the US.
Meanwhile, China is trying to build soft power in the region. It has stepped up its economic and diplomatic efforts via its Belt and Road Initiative to persuade its rival South China Sea claimants to compromise and recognise its interests and concerns. It is proposing an inclusive Indo-Pacific as an alternative to the US vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that excludes China.
Foreign Minister Qin Gang has renewed diplomatic efforts to broaden and deepen engagement with Southeast Asia, including rival claimants, and pledged to keep the South China Sea peaceful and stable. China has proposed a Global Security Initiative that includes a promise “to conduct bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with all countries and international and regional organisations”.
As a counter to what it sees as US-led cabals against it, China may even try to build its own economic and security grouping in the region, beginning with the China-leaning Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. It could try to persuade Thailand to join it and Vietnam to at least remain neutral.
But if these soft-power efforts do not persuade its rivals to compromise on their claims, it may well decide to do whatever it takes to achieve its interests in the South China Sea. This would be a realisation of what Thucydides referred to: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” It could well mean the heavy-handed use of China’s military “stick” and economic might to reward and punish “uncooperative” rival claimants.
But in so doing, China would generate widespread opprobrium and its rival claimants are likely to move even closer to the US. Still, China may calculate that it can weather the political storm. It knows that it holds long-term advantages over the US and its rival claimants. It is a permanent fixture in the region and its economic and military might is rapidly and inexorably expanding.
Indeed, it may assume there is really very little the rival claimants can do but whine, wail and plead with the US to back them up militarily. China may calculate that US backup is unlikely because, notwithstanding US rhetoric, no core US security interests are directly threatened and the US public and Congress will not support another potentially disastrous foreign adventure in defence of vague concepts such as the international order.
Moreover, if China feels sufficiently threatened, it may counter US initiatives to surround and contain it by drawing closer to Russia militarily – which would be America’s worst nightmare.
Yes, this is the worst-case scenario. But it is a realistic alternative response to the disputes, and one that China may find increasingly attractive as its rival claimants’ positions harden and the US becomes ever more deeply involved. The US as well as China’s rival claimants should at least consider the possibility that for their anti-China policies and actions, the chickens might actually come home to roost.
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US touts ‘ironclad’ commitment to the Philippines amid rising tensions in South China Sea
US touts ‘ironclad’ commitment to the Philippines amid rising tensions in South China Sea
Of course, China’s rival claimants – and the US – want to avoid this worst-case scenario. But to do so, they will have to compromise and address some of China’s concerns and interests. Perhaps the best that can be accomplished is to negotiate a series of “deals”.
For the US, this would include an agreement to back off on its enhanced diplomatic embrace of and military support for Taiwan. For China’s rival claimants in the South China Sea, it means reaching a modus vivendi with China. Perhaps the best they can hope for is arrangements in which China maintains its historic claim, to placate its nationalists, but does not enforce it.
This could include China’s priority access – under rival claimants’ management – to a share of the fishing and petroleum resources. This might be in exchange for China’s restraint from intimidating its rivals and in providing its forefront technological and capital assistance in harvesting next-generation methane hydrate resources on their continental slopes.
This scenario is not about right or wrong. Rather, it is about relative power. The reality is that China, its rival claimants and the US have to compromise. No compromise means an end point that will see China’s absolute hegemony over the South China Sea or a universally catastrophic conflict.
Political and military analysts should realise this and advise accordingly. If they have realistic alternatives short of risking war and which do not include the forlorn hope that China will back off on its claims, I and the region are all ears.
Mark J. Valencia is a non-resident senior research fellow at the Huayang Institute for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance
