When Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol met in Tokyo earlier this month, celebrations echoed in Washington.
While both countries are treaty allies of the United States, they have been at odds with each other over complaints dating back to World War II. But in the run-up to the summit, South Korea said it would no longer demand that Japanese companies compensate the Korean victims of forced labour.
The shift is largely driven by threats from China and North Korea, and the US stands to gain enormously. Cooperation between Japan and South Korea will greatly improve Washington’s security posture and its ability to counterbalance China. South Korea has also been moving steadily towards the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and there is growing discussion over whether it would formally join the grouping.
But that suggestion could unsettle a different US ally: India. For years, India has dragged its feet in the Quad, stonewalling efforts to define it as a security coalition aimed at China. With the recent Aukus deal, under which the US and Britain joined hands to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, there was a sense that Washington was expanding its options in the region to sidestep the Quad’s inadequacies in the security space.
Inducting South Korea into the Quad could directly increase pressure on India, given Seoul’s stronger military ties with the US and its closer alignment in stance with the West on Russia and Ukraine.
Indeed, with Japan and South Korea finding more common ground, India increasingly looks like a misfit within the US alliance system.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida toast at a restaurant in Tokyo on March 16. The two leaders and their wives had dinner at the restaurant. Photo: YNA/dpa
Like Japan, Australia and Britain, South Korea imposed sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine invasion. On China, Seoul has been hard-pressed to be more cautious, owing to economic considerations. But it increasingly votes and speaks like the US on multiple issues.
In 2021, South Korea issued a joint statement with the US mentioning the Taiwan Strait for the first time. Last year, it voted in favour of a resolution at the UN Human Rights Council to open a debate on Xinjiang.
India, on the other hand, does not share Washington’s views on most of these sensitive issues. It has largely stayed silent on Taiwan. It abstained on the UN resolution about Xinjiang. And ideologically, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has drifted further away from the US and its allies.
In recent times, the strident nationalism in India’s domestic politics has often put the West in its cross hairs. New Delhi’s steadfast refusal to criticise Russia over the Ukraine invasion and its continued purchases of oil from Moscow are also part of that. As a former Indian diplomat told the press: “There is a feeling of bravado in India that it has its way.”
India’s foreign ministry has also sparred with leaders in the US over Kashmir, the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act and a decline in democratic values. This year, New Delhi cracked down on the BBC’s offices in the country after it released a documentary about Modi. The White House’s muted response to that event was criticised in some quarters, but the US State Department recently issued a report listing “significant human rights issues” in India.
01:52
Indian tax officials raid BBC offices weeks after UK broadcaster airs Modi documentary
Indian tax officials raid BBC offices weeks after UK broadcaster airs Modi documentary
Meanwhile, after Sikh separatists vandalised the Indian High Commission in London, New Delhi lambasted the British government for not providing enough security.
These gulfs will only widen, and for Washington, it makes sense to pursue closer security ties with other better-aligned allies in the region. South Korea’s rapprochement with Japan and its inclusion into the Quad will both be excellent ideas.
But India’s isolation within the US alliance system also presents an opportunity for Chinese President Xi Jinping to pursue a thaw with Modi. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, India and China have often voted on the same side. Neither country has criticised Russia outright, nor called the war an invasion. Both maintain deep economic and military ties with Moscow, and have restricted themselves to calling for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine.
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US joins high-altitude military exercise with India near its Himalayan border with China
US joins high-altitude military exercise with India near its Himalayan border with China
But with the India-China border dispute still raging, Modi and Xi have had little chance to build on any of this common ground. That may yet change. This year, India plays host to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and may invite Vladimir Putin. That summit will provide a crucial forum for dialogue between the three leaders on a host of global issues and could bring out several common viewpoints.
Any rapprochement between Modi and Xi, however, will only be possible if compromises are found on the border dispute – for example, to restore the status quo before the 2020 clashes and build confidence for a more stable situation.
Amid the nationalist rhetoric in China over territorial integrity, that may sound like a lot to ask for. But if patching things up with India can weaken the US alliance system in Asia, Beijing will find no concession on the border too costly.
China has long suggested that it wants to inaugurate and lead an “Asian century” with India – a concept seemingly endorsed by New Delhi and Beijing even after the 2020 border clashes. If Xi wants to pursue that cause with Modi, the opportunity is there for the taking at this year’s SCO summit.
Mohamed Zeeshan is a foreign affairs columnist and the author of “Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership”
