Can the Abraham Accords hold after the Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire?

It is clear the violence took place in a regional context marked by a sudden reversal in US policies towards Israel and the Middle East
There is every reason to believe the ceasefire will strengthen relations between Israel and moderate Gulf states weary of a fractured Palestinian leadership

Tilak K. Doshi

Published: 3:30am, 27 May 2021

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As US President Joe Biden assumed office in January, the long-settled geopolitical presumption of the Middle East order – that Arab states would never normalise relations with Israel without a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict – had already been jettisoned in a strategic realignment of the Gulf states with Israel and against Iran.

The announcement of the United Arab Emirates’ agreement to establish full relations with Israel in August 2020, followed by Bahrain’s announcement of a similar agreement less than a month later, brought about a rapprochement between Israel and moderate Gulf Sunni states that would have been unimaginable a year earlier. By the year’s end, Sudan and Morocco had signed similar normalisation agreements with Israel.

After little more than 100 days since taking office, Biden has brought about reversals in almost every aspect of the Middle East order that marked the Abraham Accords at the tail end of the Trump administration.

It is apparent that the Hamas attacks on Israeli civilians and the Israeli military’s response in the occupied Palestinian territories took place in a regional context marked by Biden’s sudden reversal in US policies towards Israel and the Middle East of the previous administration.

Assuming the Egypt-brokered ceasefire announced last week holds, the question as to who has come out better off is on the mind of every observer of Middle East affairs.

03:40

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The Hamas narrative surrounding their missile and rocket attacks refers to the expulsion of Palestinian tenants in Sheikh Jarrah, a neighbourhood in east Jerusalem, and Israeli police actions at the Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan as motivating causes.

But beyond these, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was not shy in explaining the underlying strategy. He appeared on Iranian state-run Press TV expressing his thanks to the Iranian government for providing funds and weapons.

He said the recent conflict had thwarted Israel’s attempts at building ties with the Arab world. Haniyeh said it “defeated the illusions of negotiations, defeated the deal of the century”, in reference to the Trump administration’s peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It would seem the ceasefire has led to the re-emergence of the conflict as the focus of all discussion of peace in the Middle East. This was precisely the status quo that held before the Abraham Accords.

03:25

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Whatever the damage caused by the full-throated response by the Israeli Defence Force, the propaganda value might have been worth it for Hamas.

The Arab street has been roused against both the popularity of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as well as that of the Arab-Muslim states that signed on to Abraham Accords. Perhaps most damaging of all, extremist Arabs who are Israeli citizens set upon their Jewish neighbours, and extremist Jews set upon Arab neighbours, in ugly communal violence in some major Israeli cities.

Yet this view of a Palestinian victory – accompanied by widespread demonstrations around the world in favour of the Palestinian cause – is short-sighted. The underlying logic of the Abraham Accords remains and the structural reasons that made them possible are still intact.

Furthermore, the economic benefits of rapprochement are too important to ignore. Unlike Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which are narrowly based on security and diplomatic relations, the Abraham Accords cover economic investment and trade relations across a wide variety of sectors.

For the moderate Gulf Arab monarchies, it quickly became apparent that, in a post-Trump world, American support for traditional Arab allies could not be taken for granted. As resumption of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran seemed to be the Biden administration’s core Middle East strategy, the hedging of national security by allying with Israel became a realpolitik imperative.

Israel is the only proximate actor willing and able to challenge Iranian and Turkish attempts at regional hegemony, and an alliance with Israel has strengthened the strategic Gulf Arab posture.

In the wake of the Abraham Accords, the UAE had been in contact with Hamas about various potential infrastructure projects to improve the lives of residents there. In the midst of the conflict, it was reported the UAE had warned that its planned investments in the Gaza Strip might not move forward if Hamas did not maintain calm in the territory.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the changed perception of relations with Israel among the moderate Sunni camp was signalled by Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the US.

02:10

Israel and Hamas agree on truce to end 11-day war

In an interview aired by Saudi Al-Arabiya television last October, he launched an unprecedented attack on Palestinian leadership. He accused them of aligning with Saudi Arabia’s foes, Iran and Turkey, and criticised them for accusing the UAE and Bahrain of betraying Palestine for agreeing to establish relations with Israel.

There is every reason to believe the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will only strengthen relations between moderate Gulf Arabs and Israel. While Arab leaders sympathise with the Palestinian people, they have wearied of an intransigent and fractured Palestinian leadership.

While the Biden administration itself might be ambivalent about Trump’s signature legacy in the Middle East, it would seem outside powers such as China and Russia would be wary of underestimating the resilience of the Abraham Accords.

Dr. Tilak K. Doshi is a senior visiting research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore