China’s use of maritime militia demonstrates its control over South China Sea

Tensions over the 200 Chinese vessels moored off Whitsun Reef have again put the spotlight on the range of capabilities Beijing employs to maintain effective control of the increasingly contested and militarised waterway

Christian Le Miere

Published: 1:00am, 3 Apr 2021

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Just as the world watched the saga of the Evergreen container ship in the Suez Canal, at the other end of Asia another major maritime waterway was witnessing its own worrying events.

In the South China Sea, some 200 Chinese civilian vessels were moored off a sandbank for much of March. Much as the ship stuck in the Suez Canal showed the precarity of global trade, with a choke point that carries some 12 per cent of the world’s trade closed for six days, so the South China Sea development showed how geopolitics could threaten freedom of navigation and trade.

The presence of the Chinese vessels near a reef some 175 nautical miles off the Philippine coastline have led to recriminations from Manila and bolstered naval and aerial patrols. The events are a reminder that the South China Sea is a hotly contested and increasingly militarised waterway that carries some 30 per cent of global shipping every year.

The presence of so many Chinese vessels has led to charges that Beijing is using its “maritime militia” to enforce its claims to the sea.

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Philippines sounds alarm over 200 Chinese ships in the South China Sea

As scholars such as Andrew Erickson have showed, the militia are publicly funded, sometimes armed civilians, often in fishing vessels that can use their numerical advantage and rights as fishing vessels to “occupy” an area of sea and prevent access to or drive away other fishermen. Although civilian, the maritime militia is controlled and organised by the state.

Beijing has denied the charge, with the gathering explained away as fishermen sheltering from poor weather. But this is implausible; images show that conditions in the area are fine, and it is highly unlikely that so many commercial fishing vessels would neatly line up for several weeks, idle and not earning any revenue.

The Chinese vessels were moored just off Whitsun Reef, a nearly entirely submerged sandbar. Unlike some 50 other features in the disputed Spratly Islands, Whitsun Reef is currently unoccupied and comprises just a low-lying, right-angled reef in the sea.

Still, there is strategic value to having control of the reef. Until recently there was nothing more than a low-tide elevation there, visible only when the waters receded. Now, there appears to be a small, low-lying feature that exists even at high tide.

This distinction is important because under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, a low-tide elevation can generate no maritime claims, while an uninhabitable islet or rock can claim a 12 nautical mile territorial sea and a further 12 nautical mile contiguous zone.

Further, Whitsun Reef is the easternmost feature in a grouping called Union Banks, home to four Vietnamese-occupied features and two Chinese-occupied features.

Satellite imagery taken on March 23 shows Chinese vessels anchored at Whitsun Reef. Photo: Handout / Satellite image 2021 Maxar Technologies / AFP

The Union Banks have for decades been rich fishing grounds, particularly for Philippine fishermen. Controlling access to the atoll would enable greater management of fishing rights, as well as an ability to deny rivals freedom of navigation through the features.

Unsurprisingly, the presence of the maritime militia has created concerns in Manila and Washington that China might try to occupy the reef and develop a military installation there.

There is an obvious and recent precedent: China underwent a massive island-building and militarisation campaign in the 2010s for its seven outposts in the Spratly Islands, just as other claimants have also added airstrips, port facilities and radars on their occupied features over the years.

That remains a possibility at Whitsun Reef, but so far the actions seem to resemble more the events around Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Then, the presence of Chinese fishermen led to the deployment of a Philippine frigate and Chinese coastguard vessels, creating a stand-off that ensued for several months around the unoccupied feature.

The result, after much negotiation, was that China was left in de facto control of the shoal and Chinese fishermen continue to plough the waters unhindered, while Philippine fishermen are often refused access.

The Chinese vessels have now dispersed: Manila noted that 44 vessels remained at Whitsun Reef on March 29, with 115 vessels having moved to the nearby Kennan Reef in the Union Banks, 45 to the Philippine-occupied Thitu Islands, with another 50 at three other Chinese-occupied features.

But the episode reflects the importance of China’s maritime militia in exercising effective control of the South China Sea at particular locations and times. Beijing has been adept at using the range of capabilities available, from naval vessels to coastguard ships and the maritime militia.

With a fleet that outmatches any individual rival, it is able to bring a mass of vessels together to preclude access to other civilian, paramilitary or military claimants at any one time.

It is difficult for rivals to respond effectively, as no state wants to be seen to be the first to use force, and replying to civilian vessels with military force is disproportionate and escalatory.

At the same time, negotiations with China have been largely fruitless, with discussions over a stronger set of rules in the sea nearing 20 years in length. Manila has even used legal responses through an international tribunal, which ruled almost entirely against China, but it has not brought about a change in behaviour.

China’s rivals are thus turning to other powers to help them, particularly the United States. This has seen the US counter China’s grey zone tactics with the deployment of the Coast Guard to the Western Pacific, enabling the US to utilise a non-military capability in response.

The result is a regional dispute in the South China Sea taking on larger consequence as a fulcrum for broader Sino-US tensions.

Washington wants to ensure freedom of navigation, but China is showing that increasingly, it is able to use a range of capabilities to exert at least temporary control on one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes.

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy adviser and founder of Arcipel, a strategic consultancy