China’s predictable squeezing of Taiwan hasn’t had the desired effect, and it may be time for Beijing to rethink its strategy as a US backlash gathers pace
Michal Thim says the US’ increasing interest in countering Beijing’s pressure on Taipei, along with the apparent failure of Taiwan’s opposition to make political gains, indicates the PRC’s approach to cross-strait relations is creating more problems than it solves
For fear of losing access to the Chinese market, international companies complied. British Airways, Austrian Airlines, Singapore Airlines and scores of others now list Taipei with various forms of connection to China instead of “Taipei, Taiwan”.
However, Beijing’s push to punish Taiwanese voters for their choices is perhaps best represented by enticing Taiwan’s “diplomatic allies” to switch recognition to Beijing. A promise of large financial donations and investment that Taiwan could not match, or is not willing to match, is typically part of the deal.
El Salvador breaks ties with Taiwan and shifts to Beijing
In the wake of El Salvador’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, US Senator Cory Gardner announced his intent to introduce a bill that would encourage other countries to maintain official and unofficial relations with Taiwan, and introduce measures that the State Department could take against those countries that switch recognition or engage in otherwise adversarial actions affecting Taiwan.
Chinese leaders, diplomats and state-owned media may argue that Tsai’s administration is the problem, but observers in and out of Washington do not see it that way. Tsai’s moderate approach has earned her praise in the US, even if her low-key attitude on the issue of formal independence for Taiwan has earned her critics at home.
In the eyes of the establishment in Washington, Beijing has forfeited the goodwill granted to it by the US, and it is a high time to react accordingly. It is not certain that US actions will deter Beijing from trying to restrict Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, but they will surely give the remaining 17 “diplomatic allies” good reason to think twice.
Ultimately, China’s does not have to care much about what the US would do if it made Taiwan accept Beijing’s demands. It is a long-standing US policy to oppose the use of force by China to take Taiwan. However, it is also a US policy not to oppose political settlement between Taiwan and China if it respects the wishes of the people of Taiwan.
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The numbers went down to the long-term normal in the following weeks, and the race is very close, giving the Kuomintang a chance to rule the second-largest city in Taiwan again after four years, but the case shows how heavy-handed Beijing’s approach could be.
Beijing will undoubtedly consider Taiwan’s municipal elections in November a litmus test. If the DPP suffers significant electoral losses, it would validate Beijing’s current approach.
It is no secret that Beijing would prefer to have the KMT, the party still officially committed to unification, in charge in Taiwan. Forthcoming elections are not going to be a vote on foreign policy issues, but creating momentum for the KMT could help carry the party towards national elections in January 2020.
Beijing’s problem is that, while the DPP government is not very popular, the opposition is not capitalising on it and the polls for November do not indicate significant gains for the KMT. Now, with the US more willing to confront Beijing, perhaps it is a time for Beijing to rethink its counterproductive approach to Taiwan.
Michal Thim is a Taiwan analyst at the Association for International Affairs (Czech Republic) and an Asia-Pacific Desk contributing analyst for Wikistrat