The logic behind China's anti-corruption drive
Lanxin Xiang says China's embrace of the term 'new normal' has huge political ramifications as Xi seeks to restore the morality of a Confucian state through his anti-corruption campaign
The arrest of former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang on corruption charges has been received with widespread scepticism in the West. magazine called it a "purge" and the US government implied that it is politically motivated, perhaps on a par with Stalin's purge in the 1930s.
This argument is bordering on the absurd. But the fact that Western policymakers fail to comprehend what is going on in China is not surprising, given their cultural and historical prejudices, even as the largest anti-corruption campaign in the history of the People's Republic unfolds before our eyes. During recent visits to the US, Europe and Latin America, I was often confronted with questions about the "true" motivation of the anti-corruption campaign from many who had already formed views about a "purge".
My answer always began with the fundamental question: "What is politics"? In the Western tradition, politics is always associated with power distribution in a specified space. The idea of separation of powers derived, above all, from this spatial conception of politics. Traditional Chinese political philosophy, represented by Confucianism, defines politics as a moral issue anchored to time: ruling by virtuous example is the foundation of social stability. If any ruling power misbehaves, it will lose the "mandate of heaven", and that would automatically justify a popular rebellion for regime change.
Thus, Beijing sees the anti-corruption campaign as an operation to restore the badly damaged political legitimacy of a Confucian state. To call it a Stalinist purge is way off the mark.
The scale of official and systematic corruption is alarming, and leaders must handle it with caution and skill to avoid triggering popular resentment against the regime. It seems the leaders have adopted a smart strategy, with minimal disturbance to the system that won't necessarily result in the immediate improvement of society's well-being. The focus is squarely on the cultural problem of the mandarin elite, based on the classical story line of the erosion of Confucian morality.
Leaders are wont to talk about everything that is "new" these days; the "new status quo", "new economy", or "new Asian security architecture". But the most interesting is the "new normal".
This term was invented in the West, referring to economic conditions following the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The term has since been used in a variety of other contexts to imply that something which was previously abnormal has become commonplace.
President Xi Jinping has used the expression several times in different contexts. But the Chinese version of "new normal" seems to have powerful political consequences. To begin with, the new normal is assumed to have reconfigured the rules of the game for the Chinese state and politics. It postulates that the anti- corruption campaign will be a constant state of affairs; at the same time, economic and political reforms will continue despite the fact that they disturb the internal stability of the political elite.
This is a courageous project. But is this new political "normal" sustainable? The anti-corruption campaign is undoubtedly popular, but it will not repair the damage done to the political legitimacy of the ruling party unless the root cause is dealt with - and that lies in the political system itself: absolute power always corrupts absolutely. The implicit consensus within Chinese society is that the success or failure of the anti-corruption campaign hinges on whether the new leadership will dare to root out every big "tiger", with no exceptions.
Thus, Xi's political credibility is at stake, and his new normal cannot be on solid footing without addressing the root cause. Fortunately, the top leaders seem to have realised that political reform, including legal reform, is the only solution.
Internationally, the new normal implies that the leadership will no longer tolerate Western political values in China. But Beijing must avoid making its point using methods that hark back to cold-war ideological battles. Publicly attacking universal values and the Western democratic system doesn't help. In the West, criticising one's own system is common. The CIA torture report is just one recent example. No one assumes the democratic system is perfect.
Attacking Western democracy will achieve nothing unless it is accompanied by serious argument and plain facts. Even if we agree that democratic values may not apply universally, they have worked in a specific cultural sphere of the West and a large part of the world. And one would have to be blind to overlook the fact that it is a very efficient way to provide domestic stability and is effective as a check against the official abuse of power.
Populism disguised by cultural traditionalism has done enormous damage to China in the past. The dangers of this nationalistic new normal will only increase as China becomes more powerful.
